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The law governing the Federal budget process creates limits on spending
legislation. It also provides an exception for emergencies. In this Article, Mr.
Dauster examines the budget emergency exception, tracing its history in recent
budget summits, the legislative history of the current law, and attempts to define
the exception. The Article goes on to discuss concerns that the emergency
exception creates for relations between the President and the Congress.
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Negotiated agreements between the President and the Congress have domi-
nated the Federal budget process since the late 1980's in the era of divided
government.' Caps on the amount of money that Congress may annually appro-
priate have formed the centerpiece of the three budget agreements entered into
during this period. As Members of Congress naturally seek to maximize benefits
for their constituents, Congress has continually passed appropriation acts that
spend money up to the agreed-upon limits.
The scarcity of money under the caps has increased interest in exceptions to
the limits. Each of the budget agreements since 1986 has provided an explicit
exception for emergencies. The nature of the emergency exception, however, has
changed over this period. In its latest incarnation, as a product of the Budget
Enforcement Act of 1990,2 the emergency exception has increased in complexity,
variation, and use.
Current law creates a procedure under which both the President and Congress
designate spending as "emergency" spending. If both the President and Congress
so designate, the spending will not cause automatic cuts under the amended
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law,3 even if it worsens the deficit or causes spending
to exceed the agreed-upon caps.
This article traces the history of the emergency exception, analyzes its
meaning, examines its use, and discusses its effects on the relationship between
the executive and legislative branches.
I. The Democratic Party restored divided government by regaining control of the United States
Senate in 1986. One can argue that this has been the only period during the history of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-688 (1988 & Supp. I 1990)) [hereinafter Congressional Budget Act]
that divided Government has existed in any meaningful way. The Democratic party controlled the
Congress and the Republican Party controlled the Presidency during the first few months of the
Congressional Budget Act, but these were caretaker years for the Republican Party in the wake of
the Watergate scandal. During the Carter administration, the Democratic Party controlled both
branches. During the first six years of the Reagan administration, the Republican Party controlled
the Presidency and the Senate, and achieved working majorities in the House of Representatives.
During times of one-party control of the Government, one can expect the President to deal with the
members of his or her party in Congress, and President Reagan did so in the early 1980's. See, e.g.,
THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 1985 BUDGET REvISIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 98-213, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1984) (reporting the results of the "Rose Garden summit," in which President Reagan conferred
with Republican leaders only). Thus the summits of the late 1980's and early 1990's took on a more
adversarial character than earlier budget summits.
2. Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-573 (1990) [hereinafter the Budget
Enforcement Act].
3. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, tit.
II, 99 Stat. 1037, 1038 (1985), amended by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, tit. I-II, 101 Stat. 754 (1987), and amended by the




I. THE HISTORY OF THE EMERGENCY EXCEPTION
A. The 1987 Budget Summit
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, enacted in 1985, set up a series of Federal budget
deficit targets. 4 To force Congress and the President to meet these targets, the.
law created a procedure whereby the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of
Management and Budget, and ultimately the General Accounting Office deter-
mined how large the deficit appeared in projections made at the beginning of a
fiscal year.5 If the projected deficit exceeded the target, then the law required
the President to order across-the-board cuts - called "sequesters" - of govern-
ment funding.' In Bowsher v. Synar,7 the Supreme Court struck down the law's
requirement for automatic sequester orders. The Court held that allowing an arm
of Congress - the General Accounting Office - to direct the President when
to order the cuts violated the Constitution's doctrine of separation of powers!
After the Democrats took back control of the Senate, fiscally conservative
Democrats sought a tool to bring the President to the negotiating table with the
Democratic leadership of Congress to work out a deal to reduce the deficit. At
the same time, Republican members of Congress sought to control the size of
Government and the amount of congressional spending. These fiscally conservative
groups joined together to enact legislation restoring the automatic trigger on
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings by giving final estimating authority to the President's
Office of Management and Budget.'
The revitalized Gramm-Rudman-Hollings put pressure on the President and
Congress to reduce the deficit by specified amounts. Reacting to this pressure
and to the stock market crash of October 1987, the President and the joint
leadership of Congress began negotiating to reduce the deficit, reaching an
agreement on November 20, 1987,10 reflected in a memorandum of agreement."
The agreement limited the amounts that Congress could appropriate for
fiscal year 1988 (already nearly two months under way) and fiscal year 1989.12
Negotiators were concerned that the Congress would exceed these caps in sup-
plemental dppropriations bills-funding measures passed after enactment of the
regular annual spending bills for the thirteen subcommittees of the Appropriations
Committees. Even so, negotiators did not want to impede the ability of Congress
4. Gramm-Rudman-Holings § 201(a)(1) (amending Congressional Budget Act § 3(7), codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 622(7) (Supp. III 1985)), amended by Pub. L. No. 100-119, § 106(a), 101
Stat. 754, 780 (1987), and repealed by Budget Enforcement Act § 13112(a)(2)(A), 104 Stat. at 1388-
607.
5. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings §§ 251-252, repealed by Pub. L. No. 100-119, § 102, 101 Stat.
754, 754 (1987).
6. Id. § 252, repealed by Pub. L. No. 100-119, § 102, 101 Stat. 754, 754 (1987).
7. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
8. Id. at 721-34.
9. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-119, tit. 1-11, 101 Stat. 754 (1987), amended by the Budget Enforcement Act.
10. See Remarks Announcing a Bipartisan Plan to Reduce the Federal Budget Deficit and a
Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters, 1987 PuB. PAPEs'S 1365.
11. Summit Agreement Between the President and the Joint Leadership of Congress (Nov. 20,
1987) in Weekly Compliation of Presidential Documents 23 Oct.-Dec. 1987, 1363-1366.
12. Id.
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to address exigent situations. As well, negotiators wanted to create an exception
that could serve as a safety valve to let off steam from a deficit-reduction machine
that might otherwise blow up from pent-up pressure.
One paragraph of the memorandum of agreement addressed procedures to
implement the agreement."3 Part of that paragraph sought to limit supplemental
appropriations bills:
9. The following procedures will be utilized to implement this agreement for
spending:
c. Neither the Congress nor the President shall initiate supplementals except
in the case of dire emergency. When the Executive Branch makes such a request,
it shall be accompanied by a presidentially-transmitted budget amendment to
Congress. 14
Congress and the President thus both agreed to limit their creation of
supplemental appropriations bills to dire emergencies. Their contract did not
provide an independent means of enforcement. No change in law delegated to
the President authority to take make any cuts if either party to the contract
breached the agreement. Rather, the agreement relied on the legislative process
set forth in the Constitution's Presentment Clauses." Congress would present
proposals for emergency spending to the President in the form of bills to which
the President would then have to agree as a whole or veto. If the Congress
wished to spend the money notwithstanding the President's objections, it could
do so if it mustered two-thirds of each House.
Observers can debate the budget summit agreement's effect on the amount
of spending enacted. Congress did enact supplemental appropriations measures.' 6
The agreement did, however, result in a change in the titles of supplemental
appropriations bills from "supplemental appropriations"' 7 or "emergency sup-
plemental appropriations"'" to "dire emergency supplemental appropriations."'' 9
B. The 1989 Budget Summit
After President George Bush took office in 1989, hope grew that the
congressional leadership and the new administration could negotiate a significant
deficit reduction agreement. A group comprised of the House Majority Leader,
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2 & 3.
16. See Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-393, 102 Stat.
969 (1988); Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1988, H.R. 5096, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988).
17. E.g., Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-71, 101 Stat. 391 (July 11,
1987).
18. Joint Res. of Feb. 12, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-6, 101 Stat. 92 (1987) ("Joint Resolution
Making emergency additional funds available by transfer for the fiscal year ending September 30,
1987, for the Emergency Food and Shelter Program of the Federal Emergency Management Agency");
Joint Res. of Apr. 29, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-304, 102 Stat. 451 (1988) ("Joint Resolution Making
emergency mandatory veterans supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30,
1988").
19. Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-393, 102 Stat.
969 (1988); but see Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1988, H.R. 5096, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988).
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the Chairmen and Ranking Republican Members of the Senate and House Budget
Committees, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the
Secretary of the Treasury conducted a series of negotiations to that end in one
of the Majority Leader's conference rooms on the first floor of the Capitol.20
Negotiators agreed to manifest their agreement in a memorandum like that
drafted in 1987. As the negotiators began to discuss the language of a memo-
randum of agreement, they started with the same language on supplemental
appropriations measures as in the 1987 agreement. By April 5, however, negotia-
tors began to discuss language that would have limited supplemental appropria-
tions measures more narrowly, requiring the President to propose spending cuts
to offset all increases in discretionary spending that he proposed and requiring
Congress to ensure that no discretionary supplemental appropriations spending
worsened the deficit in fiscal years 1989 and 1990. Negotiators from the Senate
and House Budget Committees objected to the limitation. Had the negotiators
agreed on the limitation, it would have eliminated the emergency exception, and
the agreement would have called upon Congress and the President to provide for
unforeseen spending requirements within the caps.
By April 12, negotiators reintroduced the possibility of an emergency excep-
tion, this time for "truly extreme emergencies." This new term reflected frustra-
tion with the ease of using the exception. The Senate and House Budget
Committees continued to object to the language requiring spending cuts to offset
any new spending. Participants objected to the exception for "truly extreme
emergencies." Unable to agree on new language covering supplemental appro-
priations measures, the negotiators returned, by default, to the language of the
1987 agreement, and that language stayed in the' memorandum of agreement to
which the President and the congressional leadership finally acceded.
2'
Once again, Congress and the President enacted supplemental appropriations
measures, and ohce again Congress named them "dire emergency appropria-
tions."22
C. The 1990 Budget Summit
In early 1990, participants in the budget process became aware that the
revised Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets once again required painful choices.
Beginning in March 1990, a broadened negotiating team began a long series of
meetings that would eventually lead to another budget agreement in late September
and the Budget Enforcement Act in November.
In June, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget opened the
discussion of the budget process in a meeting in a wood-panelled conference
20. See Bipartisan Budget Agreement Between the President and the Joint Leadership of Congress,
25 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 553 (Apr. 14, 1989).
21. See id. at 554. The final agreement renumbered the paragraph as paragraph 11. Id.
22. See Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers, Urgent Supplementals, and
Correcting Enrollment Errors Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-45, 103 Stat. 97 (1989); Dire Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Assistance, Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation
Administration, and Other Urgent Needs, and Transfers, and Reducing Funds Budgeted for Military
Spending Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-302, 104 Stat. 213 (1990); but see Joint Res. of Dec. 6,
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-198, 103 Stat. 1792 (1989) ("Joint Resolution Making supplemental appro-
priations for the fiscal year 1990, and for other purposes").
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room off the Senate floor. The Director presented a one-page document that laid
out his requests for a series of expanded presidential powers over the budget.
He sought two measures to strengthen the discipline of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings:
a second annual estimate of the deficit tied to a second sequester possibility, and
extension of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings beyond its scheduled expiration date of
1993. Toward the goal of limiting excessive appropriations and "Non-Emergency
Supplementals," the Director sought enhanced powers for the President to rescind
spending Congress had ordered by law, sequesters to offset supplemental appro-
priations bills that exceeded the caps, and "emergency reserve accounts." A June
20 Republican proposal incorporated the same proposal.
Democratic negotiators, notably the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations
Committee, Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, quickly rejected the
Director's proposal of enhanced rescission. The Democrats prepared to discuss
provisions regarding supplemental appropriations bills much like those discussed
in prior summits. Negotiations over taxing and spending took center stage after
the President issued his June 26 statement indicating that he considered taxes a
necessary part of deficit reduction, 23 and negotiations on budget process issues
occurred only infrequently for some time.
By early September, Office of Management and Budget staff circulated a
draft of statutory language containing sections spelling out enforcement proce-
dures similar to those that the Director proposed in his initial one-page list of
requests. One section provided uniform reductions to offset supplemental appro-
priations exceeding the caps. A second required committees to set aside a two-
percent reserve for "dire emergency requirements." A third granted the President
enhanced rescission authority whenever Congress appropriated funds for a cate-
gory of spending at levels either above or below the cap.
From this primary reliance on enhanced rescission powers, Republican ne-
gotiators moved toward increased use of sequesters. Under a Republican offer
presented on the evening of September 17, 1990, if legislation (presumably signed
by the President or enacted over the President's veto) exceeded an appropriations
cap in any of three discretionary categories (domestic, defense, and international),
the President would propose rescissions in the offending summit category. If
Congress did not enact rescissions sufficient to bring spending below the cap
within fifteen days, the law would require the President to order a "categorical"
sequester in only the offending summit category. In addition, the offer called
for the Office of Management and Budget to estimate changes in the deficit at
the end of the fiscal year caused by new entitlement law. The law would then
require the President to order a "categorical lookback sequester" equal to the
amount by which entitlement law had worsened the deficit. The sequester would
cut entitlements and similar programs that result in further spending without
annual appropriations law.
At this point, Democratic negotiators advocated replacing Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings with a categorical sequester using broader categories. The system would
23. See 26 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1005 (June 26, 1990). The statement held significance in
large part because it reversed the President's often-repeated pledge made in his speech accepting the
Republican nomination for the Presidency on August 18, 1988, in which he said, "Read my lips: No




have required cuts in the broad fiscal category - appropriations, entitlements,
or taxes - responsible for any shortfall.
Office of Management and Budget negotiators offered the possibility of
emergency exceptions as an inducement for Democratic negotiators to accept
limits on discretionary spending enforced by a system of sequesters. Speaking
later, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget also cited as another
reason for creating the exception the goal of strengthening the agreement by
building into it the flexibility to accommodate unforeseen circumstances. 4
The Office of Management and Budget first proposed that the President
would have to initiate all emergency spending proposals, but negotiators rejected
that option, agreeing that Congress - just as the President - should have the
ability to initiate emergency spending proposals. Thus negotiators agreed that the
President could designate spending as an emergency requirement at any time
during the legislative process.
Final agreement on the appropriations caps came late in the negotiation
process. On September 26 and again on September 28, negotiators discussed a
number of options relating to the caps and the emergency exception. Under one
option, violation of the caps would trigger a sequester within the offending
category fifteen days after the enactment of the offending bill. The caps would
adjust for costs of dire emergencies jointly identified by the President and
Congress. Under a second option, the caps would adjust for costs of dire
emergencies only upon a presidentially-initiated supplemental request. If Congress
added either spending unrelated to the emergency or in excess of the amount to
which the President agreed, the President would order across-the-board cuts in
the offending category. Under a third option, the caps would also adjust for
costs of dire emergencies only upon a presidentially-initiated supplemental request,
but if Congress added unrelated spending or exceeded the amount, then the next
year's cap would shrink by the overage. Under a fourth option, congressional
points of order would enforce spending limits on supplemental appropriations
bills based on whether the President requested the amounts or not.
On September 30, 1990, as a small lead group of negotiators reached
agreement on the larger issues, the Office of Management and Budget released
a document detailing its view of the agreement." With regard to enforcing the
caps, this document read:
Automatic across-the-board offset triggered within each of the categories (defense;
domestic discretionary; international discretionary) to the extent any appropriation
24. In a hearing before the House Budget Committee, Director Darman had the following
exchange with Congressman Beilenson:
REP. BEILENSON: Circumstances do change and you don't like to tie the hands of
either the administration or the Congress to, you know, to change our attitude as to
where spending should be increased or decreased as the years go by.
DARMAN: ...
And that was . .. the basis for the invention of the emergency provision. Because it
was recognized that yes, the world changes both suddenly and over time, and these
things would - you couldn't have an agreement so rigid that it couldn't accommodate
them.
Mid-Session Review of the Fiscal Year 1992 Budget: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the
Budget, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1991) [hereinafter House Mid-Session Hearings].
25. Office of Management and Budget, Budget Summit Agreement (Sept. 30, 1990).
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bill (including supplementals) violates either the budget authority or outlay caps
for that category (trigger 15 days after enactment if bill enacted before July 1,
lookback if after July 1).
For a Presidentially-declared emergency request in supplementals or regular
appropriations bills, this across-the-board offset would not apply to the
extent of the funds requested by the President (only if the Congress agreed
in the Act that it was for an emergency). If Congress proposes and the
President requests new items or additional amounts for the supplemental,
the offset would not apply to the items or additions.2
Congressional staff set about drafting the enforcement law. By mid-October,
staff had come up with language on supplemental appropriations similar to that
in current law, except that the initial drafts included dollar limits on Desert
Shield emergency costs.
Budget summit negotiators did not provide for a similar emergency exception
for direct spending programs until after staff began drafting the bill. Drafters
noted that without such an exception, the Appropriations Committees would find
it easier to spend than would authorizing committees. At this point, after debate
among the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Budget Committees, it was
agreed to extend the exception to direct spending and receipts legislation.
D. Congressional Debate on the Budget Enforcement Act
The Senate conducted the most extensive and focused debate on what would
become the Budget Enforcement Act during consideration of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990.27 The Senate first saw the draft of the leadership
amendment that would become the Budget Enforcement Act late in the evening
of October 18, 1990, at the close of Senate debate on the Reconciliation Act.
That debate tended to address general propositions. Some of the debate did,
however, focus on issues related to the emergency exception.
Early in the debate, Senator Bob Graham of Florida took issue with the
amendment for taking so many items "off budget," not counting them toward
the caps and the deficit targets. 28 Senator Graham argued that it was "in part
because so many items were off budget" that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law
26. Id. at 36.
27. The Senate debate provides the best legislative history on the emergency exception. The joint
statement of managers accompanying the conference report on the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990 briefly notes the existence of the emergency exceptions, but sheds little light on their
operation. Under the heading of "I. ENFORCING DISCRETIONARY SPENDING LIMITS,"
describing the House measure, the joint statement says: "The House bill provides that the President
shall adjust the spending limits in the annual budget submission for ... Presidentially-determined
emergencies .... " H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 964, 101th Cong., 2d Sess. 1152, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374, 2857. Describing the Senate amendment, it continues: "As does the House bill,
the Senate amendment provides that the President may adjust the spending limits in the annual
budget submission for ... Presidentially-determined emergencies, and for limited defined special
allowances." Id. Of the conference agreement, the joint statement notes: "The conference agreement
establishes the limits on discretionary spending by category, as proposed by the House and Sen-
ate ... '" Id. Under the heading of "II. ENFORCING PAY-AS-YOU-GO," the joint statement
notes with regard to the conference agreement: "The conference agreement includes a provision for
emergency direct spending or receipts legislation, which would not be subject to the pay-as-you-go
requirement." Id. at 1154, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2859. Other than the conference committee, no
other committee reported the language that would become the Budget Enforcement Act.
28. See 136 CONG. Rac. S15,825 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990).
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had not yielded credible deficit reduction.29 He thus criticized, among other
things, accounting for Operation Desert Shield "outside the spending limits,
outside the deficit targets." 30 He viewed this accounting as giving "completely a
blank check for Operation Desert Shield." 3 '
Senator Ernest Hollings of South Carolina, a member and former Chairman
of the Budget Committee, criticized, among other things, vesting the estimating
power in the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.3 2 Senator Hollings
took little comfort in the procedures by which the amendment "quote-unquote
'holds harmless' Congress for the effects of spending beyond its control,
believing instead that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
would "see to it that the Administration's pet projects are held harmless." 3
As the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee defended the amendment,
Senator David Pryor of Arkansas asked about the intent of the exception for
emergency Desert Shield costs. Senator Byrd replied that the negotiators did not
know how much the operations in the Middle East would cost and how much
the allies would contribute to defray the costs of the operation.3 4 He and Senator
29. Id.
30. Id., at S15,826.
31. Id.
32. See id. at S15,827.
33. Id.
34. The exchange among Senators Pryor, Sasser, and Byrd went as follows:
Mr. PRYOR. On page 14, section (E), top of the page, this relates to Operation
Desert Shield costs, costs meaning no incremental costs directly associated with increases
in operations in the Middle East, and do not consider costs that would be experienced
by the Department of Defense as part of its normal operations absent Operation Desert
Shield.
Is there an interpretation of this that a layman like myself might understand?
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the administration at the summit wanted to include Desert
Shield in the regular appropriations process. And the question was how do we know
how much Desert Shield will cost in fiscal year 1990. The answer was, well, we would
predict that it would cost $15 billion.
My position throughout that conference was that whatever Desert Shield costs, it will
be outside this appropriation, the regular process. It would not be charged against the
defense allocation, and it will-not be charged against the domestic discretionary; it
would be done in a supplemental appropriation.
Mr. SASSER. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. BYRD. Yes.
Mr. SASSER. The funding for Operation Desert Shield would be treated as an
ordinary emergency supplemental appropriations bill.
Mr. PRYOR. It would have to be appropriated by the House and Senate.
Mr. SASSER. It would have to be appropriated. It would have to be an emergency,
subject to hearings, and acted upon by the Appropriations Committee.
The distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee was seeking to protect
the Senate and the Congress from having the administration come in here and ask for
massive sums of additional defense money without proving this was indeed an emergency
under the provisions of an emergency supplemental bill. There would be hearings. There
would be offsets from other funds collected from Saudi Arabia, et cetera.
Mr. BYRD ....
The position I took and the result of this agreement the way it is written is that the
administration would have to come before the Appropriations Committee and request
a supplemental appropriation for any amounts that result from Desert Shield.
I took the position that it ought to come by way of the appropriations process so
that the Appropriations Committee can conduct hearings, receive testimony, and find
Journal of Legislation
Jim Sasser of Tennessee, who as Chairman of the Budget Committee had been
another key negotiator, explained that the exception did not absolve the admin-
istration from having to justify that that funding constituted an emergency
requirement, as the Congress would still conduct hearings and take testimony."
Chairman Byrd explained the emergency provisions, citing natural disasters
as examples:
In addition, the agreement will allow a mechanism for both the President
and Congress to provide funding for unforeseen emergencies - earthquakes,
hurricanes and so forth - without having such costs trigger a sequester. Last
year we had two sets of disasters, hurricane Hugo and the California earthquake.
[The Office of Management and Budget] ruled that a portion of the appro-
priations that were made for these disasters was discretionary. For example, the
$1 billion appropriation that was made to repair the bridges and highways that
were destroyed in the earthquake was treated as discretionary spending. This $1
billion caused the Appropriations Committee to exceed its allocation, but we
escaped a sequester because this was a disaster that occurred after the October
15 sequester date.
Under this agreement, disasters will be treated as mandatory spending and will
not cause a sequester, no matter when they occur. And that might occur in my
State, it may occur in your State or any State."
Senator Byrd then explained another motivation for counting the costs of
Operation Desert Shield outside the caps: If the negotiators had included the
costs in the caps, the negotiators would have had to set the defense cap at a
higher amount, and that higher amount would have served as the baseline from
which Congress would have to cut. Thus, accounting for Desert Shield outside
of the caps would allow Congress to cut the defense budget more easily.' 7
Senator Bennett Johnston, also a senior member of the Budget Committee,
summed up the effect of the budget agreement in a colloquy with Chairman
Byrd." The agreement, the Senators agreed, would "give us . . . first of all,
budget peace and, second, budget certainty," without forcing the Congress
annually to adjust the underlying agreed-upon levels for "what is going to happen
in the Middle East" or the economy.
39
The Senate went on to reject by a vote of 75 to 25 a procedural challenge
that Senator Hollings made to the amendment. 40 Thereafter, the Senate adopted
the amendment by a voice vote.4 '
out how much other countries are contributing to Desert Shield.
We have no way of seeing how much they are going to contribute. We have no way
of knowing what the costs are going to be. We cannot predict what is going to happen
in the desert.
Therefore, if the administration wants to make requests for Desert Shield, let the
administration come before the Senate and House, before the Appropriations Committee,
request its supplementals, and submit the facts and let the Senate and House make a
judgment thereon. It will be outside this process, so the Senate and the House are fully
protected insofar as Desert Shield is concerned.
Id. at S15,831.
35. See id.
36. Id. at S15,834-35.
37. See id.
38. See id. at S15,835.
39. Id.
40. See id. at S15,839.
41. See id. at S15,840.
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II. THE BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT'S STATUTORY SCHEME 42
Unlike the 1987 and 1989 summit agreements, the 1990 budget summit
agreement manifested itself not in a contract, but in a change of law, the Budget
Enforcement Act. The Budget Enforcement Act significantly revised Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings and also changed the Congressional Budget Act. As discussed
above, 43 prior to 1990, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings forced the President and Con-
gress to reduce the deficit to meet a set of fixed deficit targets. The Budget
Enforcement Act revised Gramm-Rudman-Hollings so that, through fiscal year
1993, the law enforces the deficit reduction path on which the President and
Congress agreed. Thereafter, for fiscal years 1994 and 1995, Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings may either continue as modified or revert to a system not unlike the
pre-1990 law, at the option of the President."
Through fiscal year 1993, the Budget Enforcement Act replaced deficit targets
on center stage with two new enforcement mechanisms. For that period, the law
divides the budget process into two parts: one for appropriations4 and another
for entitlements and taxes. 46 All taxing and spending legislation (other than laws
for Social Security and the Postal Service, which Congress has taken off budget4 7)
falls into one of the two parts. A series of caps govern appropriations." The




The Budget Enforcement Act amended section 601 of the Congressional
Budget Act to create a series of caps to enforce the agreement to reduce
41. See id. at S15,840.
42. This section draws on the author's work in S. REp. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 61-71
(1991).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
44. See Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 253(g)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 903(g)(l)(B)
(Supp. 11 1990)).
The conventional wisdom in Washington holds that the President and the Congress will choose
to renegotiate the budget agreement in early 1993, after the Presidential elections. For example, on
July 17, 1991, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget said before the House Budget
Committee:
I think we should, at an early stage in '93, seek to extend the [Budget Enforcement
Act]. It may be that we can refine it. I think we have learned some things along the
way and I would have some suggestions about how to refine it but the basic structure
should be extended because as you know, it lapses for '95. One of its virtues is it allows
you to plan for the longer term, with some predictable levels, at least in the discretionary
area.
House Mid-Session Hearings, supra note 24.
45. See Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 251 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901 (Supp. 11 1990)).
46. See id. § 252 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 902 (Supp. 11 1990)).
47. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 took the Postal Service off budget. Budget
Enforcement Act § 13301 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 632 (Supp. 11 1990)) completed the
process of taking Social Security off budget. For a legislative history of the budgetary treatmen't.of
Social Security, see SENATE CoMa. ON THE BUDGET, SOCIAL SECURITY PRESERVATION ACT, S. REP.
No. 426, 101ST Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
48. See Congressional Budget Act § 601(a)(2) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 665(a)(2)
(Supp. l 1990)).
49. See Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 252 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 902 (Supp. 11 1990)).
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appropriations. 0 Section 601 sets forth caps on both budget authority and
outlays." For fiscal years 1991, 1992, and 1993, the law sets forth caps on three
categories: defense, international, and domestic. The law sets forth caps on only
the total of all appropriations for 1994 and 1995. Whereas in prior years, the
congressional budget resolution gave the Appropriations Committee an overall
allocation of budget authority and outlays, 2 for fiscal years 1992 and 1993, six
additional numbers (budget authority and outlays for each of three caps) constrain
appropriations.1
5 3
If Congress and the President enact appropriations that exceed any of these
six caps, section 251 of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings requires the President to order
a sequester in only the category that the appropriations breached.5 4 The Office
of Management and Budget must estimate the cost of any appropriations bill
within five days after its enactment. This estimate controls the process." The
sequester's timing depends on when the spending occurs. For regular appropri-
ations bills enacted before Congress adjourns to end a session, the sequester
occurs fifteen days after the end of session. 6 For spring supplemental appropri-
ations bills (that is, any enacted after starting a new session but before July 1),
the sequester occurs fifteen days after enactment of the bill."7 Finally, for
supplemental appropriations enacted after June 30, the law lowers the target for
the next year.58 Consequently, either appropriations bills for the next fiscal year
spend at the lower level, or under the first rule a sequester occurs fifteen days
after the end of session.
Points of order also enforce the caps in budget resolutions and appropriations
bills in the Senate. 9 These points of order require sixty Senators to waive.6
The law provides for several adjustments to the caps. 6' Some adjustments
simply provide technical consistency, such as those adjusting for changes in
concepts and definitions, 62 changes in inflation, 63 and credit re-estimates.6 4 Some
50. See Budget Enforcement Act § 13111 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 665-665e (Supp.I1
1990)).
51. Budget authority and outlays provide two different measures of spending. Generally, budget
authority means "the authority ... to incur financial obligations" (Congressional Budget Act §
3(a)(2) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 622(2)(A) (Supp. 1 1990)), whereas outlays mean actual
"expenditures . . . under budget authority." Id. § 3(a)(1) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 622(1)
(1988)). Budget authority is analogous to the sticker price of the car you buy; outlays are analogous
to your annual payments.
52. See Congressional Budget Act § 302 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 633 (1988 & Supp.
11 1990)).
53. See id. §§ 601-602 (codified as amended 2 U.S.C. §§ 665-665a (Supp. H 1990)).
54. See Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 251(a)(2) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (Supp.
11 1990)).
55. See id. § 251(a)(7) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(7) (Supp. 1 1990)).
56. See id. § 251(a)(1) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(l) (Supp. H 1990)).
57. See id. § 251(a)(6) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(6) (Supp. 11 1990)).
58. See id. § 251(a)(5) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(5) (Supp. H 1990)).
59. See Congressional Budget Act § 601(b) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 665(b) (Supp. II
1990)).
60. See id. § 904(b).
61. See Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 251(b) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(b) (Supp. 11
1990)).
62. See id. § 251(b)(l)(A) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 11 1990)).
63. See id. § 251(b)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 11 1990)).
64. See id. § 251(b)(1)(C) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(l)(C) (Supp. 11 1990)).
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adjustments reflect policy decisions made at the summit, including adjusting for
Internal Revenue Service enforcement initiatives, 6 Egyptian and Polish debt
forgiveness," and International Monetary Fund special drawing rights.6 7 Some
adjustments make provision for estimating differences between the Office of
Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office68 or simply allow
for more spending than the caps appear to set forth; 69 the law calls these
"allowances." Finally, as discussed at length below,' 0 the caps adjust for what
the President and the Congress both agree to designate as "emergencies."
'"7
B. The Pay-as-You-Go Process
The new budget law calls the system governing entitlements "enforcing pay-
as-you-go."' 72 The basic rule governing the pay-as-you-go system requires Congress
and the President to pay for all entitlement spending increases and tax cuts with
offsetting entitlement spending cuts or tax increases for the same fiscal year.
The new law requires the President to order a sequester in certain entitlements
at the end of each session of Congress in which changes in law increase entitlement
spending or cut taxes without paying for them. 73 Changes in entitlement spending
or tax receipts brought on by causes other than legislation - such as a worsening
economy - do not count under the pay-as-you-go system.' 4 The sequester
threatens the same entitlement programs that the old Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
law put in peril, most significantly Medicare and farm price supports. 75
In addition to this constraint that the new law requires the President to
enforce, the law also calls on Congress to constrain spending through points of
order that the Senate can waive only with the affirmative vote of sixty Senators.'
6
In the pay-as-you-go system, these points of order enforce allocations made by
budget resolutions. The budget resolution divides all spending among committees
in allocations some call "crosswalks" or "302(a) allocations." 77 If a bill spends
more in a committee's jurisdiction (together with all other laws passed to date)
than the budget resolution allocated to that committee, then any Senator may
raise a point of order requiring sixty votes to waive .' The point of order
enforcing committee allocations applies to the first year covered by a budget
65. See id. § 251(b)(2)(A) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1990)).
66. See id. § 251(b)(2)(B) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 11 1990)).
67. See id. § 251(b)(2)(C) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2)(C) (Supp. I1 1990)).
68. See id. § 251(b)(2)(F) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2)(F) (Supp. 11 1990)).
69. See id. § 251(b)(2)(E) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2)(E) (Supp. 11 1990)).
70. See infra notes 84-114 and accompanying text.
71. See Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 251(b)(2)(D) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2)(D)
(Supp. 11 1990)).
72. See id. § 252 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 902 (Supp. I 1990)).
73. See id. § 252(a) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 902(a) (Supp. It 1990)).
74. See id. § 252(b) 2 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. 11 1990).
75. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D CONG, IST SESS., OVERVIEW OF
ENTITLEMENT PRoLRAS: 1991 GREEN BoOK 1592-93 (Comm. Print No. 9, 1991).
76. See Congressional Budget Act §§ 302, 602, 904(c) (codified as amended at U.S.C. §§ 633,
665a (Supp. 11 1990)).
77. See id. §§ 302(a), 602(a) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 633(a), 665a(a) (Supp. II
1990)).
78. See id. § 302(f), 602(c), 904(c) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 633(f), 665a(c) (Supp.
11 1990)).
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resolution and to the five-year totals for each committee in the budget resolution. 9
C. Deficit Targets
As originally enacted in 1985, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings set forth a series of
fixed deficit targets.80 The law then created a system of sequesters to reduce the
deficit projected at the beginning of a fiscal year to the amount of the fixed
targets. As noted above, the Budget Enforcement Act revised these targets, and
then, through a series of economic and technical adjustments, 8' makes these
revised targets all but irrelevant to the budget process, at least for fiscal years
through 1993.
Their relevance could be restored, however, if the President chooses to
discontinue the regime of economic and technical adjustments. If the President
makes that choice (which the law allows the President who holds office on the
day after the inauguration of the President elected in 1992), then the law will
impose a third layer of sequesters on top of the sequesters for appropriations
and pay-as-you-go legislation. 2 If the President chooses to restore this layer, then
section 253 of the amended Gramm-Rudman-Hollings will, in all likelihood,
require further deficit reduction after Congress and the President have complied
with the appropriations caps and the requirement that direct spending and receipts
legislation not worsen the deficit. As discussed below,83 the emergency exception
continues to apply to the deficit targets. Consequently, emergency spending may
take on even greater significance if the President chooses to revert to the regime
of fixed deficit targets.
D. Emergencies Under the New Law
1. The General Rule
Sections 251(b)(2)(D) and 252(e) of the amended Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
provide for designation of emergencies. Section 251 provides the rule for appro-
priations acts, while section 252 provides the rule for pay-as-you-go legislation.
Both sectins provide essentially the same rule. The law provides that if the
President designates a provision as an emergency requirement, and the Congress
also so designates in law, then the spending will not count under the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings system of sequesters.
For appropriations acts, section 251(b)(2) creates the exception for emergen-
cies by requiring the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to
calculate adjustments to the caps in the Director's sequestration reports. The
President must then include these adjustments in the revised caps in the budgets
79. See id. §§ 602(c), 606(a) (codified as amended 2 U.S.C. §§ 665a(c), 665e(a) (Supp. 11 1990)).
80. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 201(a)(1) (amending Congressional Budget Act § 3(7), codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 622(7) (Supp. III 1985)), amended by Pub. L. No. 100-119, § 106(a), 101
Stat. 754, 780 (1987), and repealed by Budget Enforcement Act § 13112(a)(2)(A) (codified as amended
at 2 U.S.C. §622(7) (Supp.II 1990)).
81. See Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 253(g) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 903(g) (Supp. II
1990)).
82. See id. §§ 253(g)(1)(B), (C) & (D), 254(a) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 903(g)(1)(B),
(C) & (D), 904(a) (Supp. II 1990)).
83. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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that the President submits to Congress.8 For direct spending law, section 252(b)
instructs the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to calculate the
amount of any net deficit increase caused by all direct spending and receipts
legislation, which the law then defines to exclude emergency spending. a5
Even if the President chooses to restore the system of fixed deficit targets
for fiscal years 1994 and 1995, emergencies will still not contribute to sequestra-
tion. Section 253(b)(2) defines the excess deficit, that is, the amount that the
President must sequester, to exclude "the amounts for that year designated as
emergency direct spending or receipts legislation under section 252(e). "86 Section
253(g)(1)(C) requires that, in the event that the President chooses to restore the
system of fixed deficit targets, the deficit targets for each year nonetheless adjust
by the amount of the adjustments to discretionary spending limits under section
251(b), which includes the adjustment for emergencies.8 7
Section 251 (b)(2)(D)(i) sets forth the general rule for designating emergencies
in appropriations law:
84. Section 251(b)(2) provides in part:
(b) ADJUSTMENTS TO DISCRETIONARY SPENDING LIMITS. -.
(2) When OMB submits a sequestration report under section 254(g) or (h) for fiscal
year 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, or 1995 (except as otherwise indicated), OMB shall calculate
(in the order set forth below), and the sequestration report, and subsequent budgets
submitted by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, shall
include, adjustments to discretionary spending limits (and those limits as adjusted) for
the fiscal year and each succeeding year through 1995, as follows:
(D) EMERGENCY APPROPRIATIONS....
Id. § 251(b)(2); 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1990). Section 250(c)(15) defines "OMB" to mean
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. 2 U.S.C. § 900(c)(15) (Supp. 11 1990).
85. Section 252(b) provides in part:
(b) SEQUESTRATION; LOOK-BACK. - Within 15 calendar days after Congress
adjourns to end a session . . . , there shall be a sequestration to offset the amount of
any net deficit increase in that fiscal year and the prior fiscal year caused by all direct
spending and receipts legislation enacted after the date of enactment of this section
(after adjusting for any prior sequestration as provided by paragraph (2)). OMB shall
calculate the amount of deficit increase, if any, in those fiscal years by adding -
(1) all applicable estimates of direct spending and receipts legislation transmitted
under subsection (d) applicable to those fiscal years, other than any amounts included
in such estimates resulting from -
(B) emergency provisions as designated under subsection (e) ....
2 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. 11 1990).
86. Section 253(b) defines "excess deficit" as follows:
(b) EXCESS DEFICIT; MARGIN. - The excess deficit is, if greater than zero, the
estimated deficit for the budget year, minus -
(1) the maximum deficit amount for that year;
(2) the amounts for that year designated as emergency direct spending or receipts
legislation under section 252(e) ....
2 U.S.C. § 903(b) (Supp. 11 1990).
87. Section 253(g)(1)(C) provides:
(C) When the budget for fiscal year 1994 or 1995 is submitted and the sequestration
reports for those years under section 254 are made (as applicable), if the President does
not choose to make the adjustments set forth in subparagraph (B), the maximum deficit
amount for that fiscal year shall be adjusted by the amount of the adjustment to
discretionary spending limits first applicable for that year (if any) under section 251(b).
2 U.S.C. § 903(g)(1)(C) (Supp. II 1990).
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(D) EMERGENCY APPROPRIATIONS. - (i) If, for fiscal year 1991,
1992, 1993, 1994, or 1995, appropriations for discretionary accounts are enacted
that the President designates as emergency requirements and that the Congress
so designates in statute, the adjustment shall be the total of such appropriations
in discretionary accounts designated as emergency requirements and the outlays
flowing in all years from such appropriations. 8
Section 252(e) sets forth parallel language for designating emergencies in
direct spending and receipts legislation:
(e) EMERGENCY LEGISLATION. - If, for fiscal year 1991, 1992, 1993,
1994, or 1995, a provision of direct spending or receipts legislation is enacted
that the President designates as an emergency requirement and that the Congress
so designates in statute, the amounts of new budget authority, outlays, and
receipts in all fiscal years through 1995 resulting from that provision shall be
designated as an emergency requirement in the reports required under subsection
(d)."
Note that in each case, the President and Congress designate as emergencies
provisions of law, rather than all of a law. For appropriations acts, the President
and Congress designate "appropriations," that is, specific provisions of law
making appropriations. 90 For direct spending and receipts legislation, the President
and Congress designate "provisions." 9' The President and Congress may thus
designate some or all of the provisions in a bill that contains several provisions. 92
Note that while the 1987 and 1989 summit agreements reserved to Congress
the option to enact supplemental appropriations acts for "dire emergencies," the
new law allows such emergency legislation only if the President and the Congress
agree outside of the normal legislative and constitutional process. Thus where
the prior summit agreements reserved powers to Congress notwithstanding the
contract into which Congress entered, the new law grants power to the President
to limit the cases in which Congress uses its power.
The language of sections 251(b)(2)(D)(i) and 252(e) link the President and
the Congress by a simple conjunction. The law thus sets forth a requirement that
both act before a provision becomes an emergency requirement. The law says
nothing about the order of the action. The President need not designate the
emergency first, but may follow Congress's action. 9
88. 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2)(D)(i) (Supp. H 1990).
89. 2 U.S.C. § 902(e) (Supp. I1 1990).
90. See Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 251(b)(2)(D)(i); 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2)(D)(i) (Supp. 11 1990).
91. See id. § 252(e); 2 U.S.C. § 902(e) (Supp. I 1990).
92. The President has designated emergency appropriations in dollar amounts. An early example
of Presidential emergency designation appeared in the President's request for supplemental appro-
priations of February 22, 1991. THE PRESmENT, SuPPLE ENTAL NoN-DEENSE APPROPRATiONS RE-
QUEST FOR FisCAL YEAR 1991, H.R. Doc. No 102-44, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (reprinting letter
from President George Bush to Speaker Thomas Foley (Feb. 22, 1991); Letter from Director Richard
Darman to President George Bush (Feb. 21, 1991)). For excerpts from the text of that request, see
infra note 169.
93. On occasion, Members of Congress have requested that the President designate items as
emergency requirements. An early example, made by the Majority Leader, the Chairman of the
Budget Committee and the Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee in a letter to the President,
called for designating unemployment insurance expenses as emergency requirements. Letter from
Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, Chairman Jim Sasser, and Chairman Paul S. Sarbanes to
President George Bush (Feb. 25, 1991). For text from the letter, see infra note 185.
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The law requires Congress to designate "in statute." The law does not,
however, require the designation to appear in the same statute as the spending
or receipts provision itself. Congress could set forth its designation in a law
enacted prior to the spending provision, for example in an authorization bill.
The law does not set forth any further procedure for how the President may
designate an emergency. The President may thus designate provisions as emergency
requirements in any manner the President chooses. The President may send a
written letter or simply announce the decision orally before signing the bill into
law.
The President should choose whether or not to designate on or before the
date of enactment. If the President has not made the choice clear by that point,
the President creates unnecessary ambiguity in enforcement of and accounting
for the law. In any case, the President must decide by the fifth day after
enactment, when the President's Office of Management and Budget must issue
a cost estimate for the newly enacted law in which the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget will either have to count the provision in question or
not.95
2. The Effect of the President's Signature
In the procedure envisioned by the law, the President may choose to sign
the legislation without designating provisions as emergency requirements. The
provisions would then count fully under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings scheme
against the caps or the pay-as-you-go requirement of deficit neutrality or the
deficit targets.
Note, however, that changes in drafting can result in differing effects from
the President's signature. One can distinguish three cases.
First, Congress may write legislation stating: "Pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(D)
of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Congress
designates the spending provided in section 1 as emergency requirements." This
language makes Congress's intent plain. Congress would be playing its part in
the process envisioned by section 251(b)(2)(D), inviting the President to designate
spending as an emergency. The President could sign such legislation and simul-
taneously announce the choice not to designate such spending as an emergency
requirement.
Second, Congress could write legislation stating: "Notwithstanding section
251(b)(2)(D) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
the spending provided in section 1 shall be considered emergency requirements
within the meaning of that Act." Once again, this legislation makes Congress's
intent plain. Congress would be legislating later-enacted law to supersede the
provisions in the Budget Enforcement Act granting the President authority to
designate spending as an emergency requirement. In this case, the President's act
of signing the legislation would end the discussion, and the later-enacted provision
94. Note that the law requires the Congress to designate "in statute," but requires the President
merely to designate. See id. §§ 251(b)(2)(D)(i) & 252(e); 2 U.S.C. §§ 901(b)(2)(D)(i) & 902(e) (Supp.
II 1990). The Congress thus demonstrated its ability to constrain the manner of designating if it so
desired.
95. See id. §§ 251(a)(7) & 252(d); 2 U.S.C. §§ 901(a)(7) & 902(d) (Supp. 11 1990).
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directing the President to consider the section an emergency requirement would
control. It would not matter what the President said in the signing statement.
The President would have no legal basis to disregard the later-enacted statute in
favor of the Budget Enforcement Act provisions as originally drafted.
Congressman Gradison, the Ranking Minority Member of the House Budget
Committee, asked the Director of the Office of Management and Budget about
a subset of this second case, where the language of would deem the President's
signature of a bill to constitute his agreement that certain items within that bill
constituted emergencies. 96 One can imagine a variety of wordings, for example:
"Upon signature of this bill, the President will be deemed to have designated
sections X, Y, and Z as emergency requirements within the meaning of section
251(b)(2)(D) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985." The Director expressed his belief that this language allowed the President
some flexibility:
[T]he Congress cannot deem for the President, and ... if the president took
such a law as you describe hypothetically, signed it, and in signing it, said that
he was not deeming it to be an emergency or any subpiece of it to be an
emergency, then with respect to that subpiece, it would not at that point be
jointly declared to be an emergency.9
The Director's position is curious. It seems to rely on a grant of power from
Congress to the President made in the prior-enacted Budget Enforcement Act to
96. Congressman Gradison and Director Darman had the following exchange:
REP. GRADISON: Mr. Darman, one of the ideas that's cropped up in some of the
appropriations bills has been a provision - I don't have a copy of it in front of me,
but the essence of it is that the signature of a given bill by the president would be
deemed to be his agreement that certain items within that bill are emergencies. I don't
believe any of these has reached his desk yet. Frankly, I hope none does. But I wonder
if you could examine that principle or have any legal opinions on whether such action
would override the provisions of the Budget Enforcement Act.
DARMAN: I do have opinions and I will state them. I believe that, and I think we
almost all agree that it's clear, including most of the appropriators, that the Budget
Enforcement Act requires that both the President and the Congress agree that something
is an emergency in order for it to be subject to the emergency exemption.
.So now the question that you put arises: what happens if a law passes in which the
Congress says that they deem this to be an emergency and by the act of signing, the
president is deeming it to be an emergency? You're correct, I believe, that we have not
had any such law. We've had some try to work their way forward. Unfortunately,
they've been stopped along the way.
We would take the position that the Congress cannot deem for the President, and
that if the President took such a law as you describe hypothetically, signed it, and in
signing it, said that he was not deeming it to be an emergency or any subpiece of it to
be an emergency, then with respect to that subpiece, it would not at that point be
jointly declared to be an emergency.
I think that would then come for legal challenge. I think it creates an undesirable
mess, conflict that we should well avoid, and that we ought not to - I mean, it's
being too cute. We're going to end up - somebody's going to outsmart themselves
and the system in the process with that.
So I think we're much better advised to try to call them straight. If the Congress
says it's an emergency, we should say, and we're prepared to say, in advance, do we
agree or not agree. And if we disagree, we disagree. If we agree, it's an emergency
subject to the exemption. That's I think the way the system was intended to work and
that's what we should make it do.
House Mid.Session Hearings, supra note 24.
97. Id.
Budget Emergencies
overrule the later-enacted law deeming an item an emergency. After all, in the
hypothetical later bill, Congress does not call for the President to exercise
judgment. Rather, the hypothetical bill directs in law that the President must
treat certain provisions as if the President had exercised judgment under another
statute.
Consider the similar case where Congress grants the President authority to
issue a rule governing a certain subject. The President then exercises judgment
under that law and issues the rule. The Congress then passes a law stating that
the President shall be deemed not to have promulgated the rule. The Director's
position would lead to the absurd conclusion that the President could sign the
second law and then choose not to enforce it because an earlier law had once
given him power to issue the rule.
Third. The third type of emergency language would ambiguously state
congressional intent: Congress could write legislation stating: "Any spending
provided in section 1 is an emergency requirement." Here, Congress has not
made clear its intent. Is Congress merely exercising its option under section
251(b)(2)(D) of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings to designate, awaiting the President's
designation? Alternatively, is Congress thereby legislating later-enacted law that
intends to wrest the designation of emergency away from the President? The
President should seek to give effect to Congress's intent, but the law gives the
President room to find that intent where the President wants. 9 The prudent
drafter should avoid the ambiguity of this third option and opt for one of the
two others.
Drafting may add yet another wrinkle to the effect of the President's
signature. The legislation may make funding for the provision in question
contingent on the President's designation of the provision as an emergency
requirement." In other words, the legislation may state that the provision will
take effect only if the President designates it as an emergency requirement. If
Congress uses such language, the Budget Committees and the Office of Manage-
98. Indeed, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget appears willing to disregard
congressional intent and act as though Congress intended the result granting the President the widest
discretion.
99. For example:
SEC. 10. EMERGENCY DESIGNATION.
(a) EMERGENCY DESIGNATION. - Pursuant to sections 251(b)(2)(D)(i) and 252(e)
of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, the Congress
hereby designates all direct spending amounts provided by this Act (for all fiscal years)
and all appropriations authorized by this Act (for all fiscal years) as emergency
requirements within the meaning of part C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985.
(b) EFFECTIVENESS. - Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any other
provision of this Act, none of the preceding sections of this Act shall take effect unless,
not later than the date of the enactment of this Act, the President submits to the
Congress a written designation of all direct spending amounts provided by this Act (for
all fiscal years) and all appropriations authorized by this Act (for all fiscal years) as
emergency requirements within the meaning of part C of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
S. 1554, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. S10,781, S10,784 (daily ed. July 24, 1991); Emergency
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, H.R. 3201, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC.




ment and Budget cannot score the provision as costing anything, for either the
President will designate it as an emergency (and it will thus not count by virtue
of the law regarding emergency provisions), or the President will not designate
it as an emergency (and it will not take effect at all by virtue of the contingency
language).
3. Congressional Enforcement
The amended Congressional Budget Act enforces budget resolution alloca-
tions, the appropriations caps, and deficit targets by allowing Members of
Congress to raise points of order against legislation that violates the limits. ' ° In
the Senate, waiving these points of order often requires a supermajority. 0 ' For
the purposes of congressional enforcement, each House of Congress relies on
estimates made by its Budget Committee. 2 When should the Budget Committee
count legislation that purports to fall within the emergency exception to the caps
or the pay-as-you-go requirement?
The Congressional Budget Act provides that the Budget Committees shall
not count these emergency provisions in its determinations under Congressional
Budget Act points of order.' 3 During floor consideration, how can the Budget
Committee identify these provisions? Budget Committee staff should review
legislation on a case-by-case basis and assess the probability that the President
and Congress will designate provisions as emergencies.
In the language of the law, section 251(b)(2)(D) of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
excepts from the appropriations caps "appropriations for discretionary accounts
... enacted that the President designates as emergency requirements and that
the Congress so designates in statute."'04 Similarly, section 252(e) of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings excepts from the pay-as-you-go scheme "a provision of direct
spending or receipts legislation . . . enacted that the President designates as an
emergency requirement and that the Congress so designates in statute." 15 Section
606(d)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act provides that "[flor purposes of
congressional consideration of provisions described in [these sections on emer-
gencies], determinations under sections [of the Congressional Budget Act provid-
ing points of order] shall not take into account any new budget authority, new
entitlement authority, outlays, receipts, or deficit effects in any fiscal year of
those provisions." 106
Several options (most unsatisfactory) exist for rules to guide the Budget
Committees:
100. See Congressional Budget Act §§ 302, 311, 601, 602 & 605, 2 U.S.C. §§ 633, 642, 665a &
665d (1988 & Supp. I 1990).
101. See id. § 904(c).
102. See id. §§ 201(g), 302(g), 310(d)(4), 311(c), 313(e); Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 258B(h)(4);
2 U.S.C. §§ 602(g), 633(g), 641(d)(4), 642(c), 644(e), 907c(h)(4) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
103. See Congressional Budget Act § 606(d)(2), 2 U.S.C. § 665e(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1990).
104. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 251(b)(2)(D)(i), 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2)(D)(i) (Supp. 11 1990).
105. Id. § 252(e), 2 U.S.C. § 902(e) (Supp. 11 1990).
106. Congressional Budget Act § 606(d)(2), 2 U.S.C. § 665e(d)(2) (Supp. I 1990). The drafters
of section 606 intended by reference to points of order in sections 302, 303, and 311 to address as




1. Wait for designation both by the Congress by statute and by the President.
This option would require both branches of government to take action before
the Budget Committee applied the exception. For example, the Congress could
enact an authorization that designates the emergency status of appropriations.
This would severely limit the number of emergencies, and would create the
ungainly requirement that authorizing committees enact two pieces of legislation
to enact a pay-as-you-go emergency. This option would merit no attention if it
were not the treatment resulting from a literal reading of the new law. It does
not, however, reflect the intent of the drafters.
2. Wait for the President to designate formally. This option would require
the President to send Congress a letter or otherwise formally announce designa-
tion. The Budget Committees would then presume that the Congress would agree
that the provision constituted an emergency (a presumption well grounded in
experience). This option would give the President the whip hand and would
severely limit emergencies.
3. Presume to be emergencies any provisions so designated in the language
of the bill, unless the President has not explicitly rejected the designation. This
option would change what happens when the President's position is unclear. If
the language of the statute purported to create an emergency, the Budget
Committees would not score the provision unless the President had made clear
that he or she would not designate the provision as an emergency.
4. Presume to be emergencies any provisions so designated in the language
of the bill. This option has the virtue of simplicity. The Budget Committees used
this approach in applying the prohibition on transfers of spending from one year
to another in section 202 of the 1987 revision of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. 1', As
Members interested in spending would soon learn the magic words that exempted
their bill or amendment from the budget process, however, this option would
soon render the Budget Committees bystanders to the process.
5. Exercise the Committee's best judgment as to the probability that the
President will designate the provision to be an emergency. This option reserves
to the Budget Committees the most discretion. It also represents the procedure
most closely tailored to the intent of the new law. One cannot easily articulate
it as a neutral principle, however, and it may leave the Budget Committees open
to accusations of practicing situational ethics.
4. Desert Shield Costs
The previous section discusses the general rule. In addition, the statute sets
forth a particular case of emergency treatment that requires special attention.
Section 251(b)(2)(D)(ii) defines the "costs for operation Desert Shield" as emer-
gency requirements. Thus, for these costs, the President and the Congress need
not formally designate the provisions as emergency requirements, as the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings law has already done so.
The statute provides:
107. Pub. L. No. 100-119, § 202, 101 Stat. 754, 784 (1987), repealed by Budget Enforcement Act
§ 13212; 104 Stat 1388, 1388-621 (1990). For a discussion of this section and its failings, see WILLIAM
G. DAUSTER, BUDGET PROCEss LAW ANNOTATED 649-52 (1991).
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(ii) The costs for operation Desert Shield are to be treated as emergency
funding requirements not subject to the defense spending limits. Funding for
Desert Shield will be provided through the normal legislative process. Desert
Shield costs should be accommodated through Allied burden-sharing, subsequent
appropriation Acts, and if the President so chooses, through offsets within other
defense accounts. Emergency Desert Shield costs mean those incremental costs
associated with the increase in operations in the Middle East and do not include
costs that would be experienced by the Department of Defense as part of its
normal operations absent Operation Desert Shield.'10
The last sentence of this subparagraph defines "Desert Shield costs." The
second sentence makes clear that Desert Shield costs come out of defense accounts,
as the President may choose to offset them with cuts in "other defense ac-
counts.9''s One could read the last sentence to imply that Desert Shield costs are
a subset of costs "experienced by the Department of Defense," although that
has not been the practice." 0 The statutory language thus does not appear to
anticipate that expenditures for veterans' benefits or foreign aid related to
Operation Desert Shield would fall within the definition of Desert Shield costs."'
108. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 251(b)(2)(D)(ii), 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2)(D)(ii) (Supp. 11 1990).
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. See, e.g., infra note 156 and accompanying text.
Ill. On February 5, 1991, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget sent the
following letter touching on this point to the Majority Leader, the Republican Leader, and the
Chairmen and Ranking Republican Members of the Appropriations, Armed Services, and Budget
Committees:
Last week, the Senate Armed Services committee marked up several spending bills
related to military personnel. Review of that mark-up suggests that some may not
correctly understand the "emergency" and "Desert Shield" exemptions enacted last
year in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA). I thought it would be useful to
clarify the terms and implications of these exemptions, as we understand them.
Exemption for Desert Shield
The BEA contains a provision exempting the costs of Operation Desert Shield from
the defense discretionary spending cap. That provision (section 251(b)(2)(D)(ii)) states,
in relevant part:
Only the "incremental costs" of Desert Shield qualify under this exemption. Thus,
for example, S. 232, which increases life insurance coverage for everyone in the service
- regardless of any connection with or needs of Desert Shield - would not qualify as
incremental costs of Operation Desert Shield.
Letter from Richard Darman to Sen. Jim Sasser (Feb. 5, 1991).
Similarly, on March 5, 1991, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget wrote to
the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee regarding the supplemental appropriations
measures associated with Operation Desert Shield (H.R. 1281 and H.R. 1282):
Although we are, of course, deeply appreciative of the Israeli role and responsibility in
the conduct of the War, such an amendment could present two serious problems:
First, we could not justify the expenditure if it were at or above the level
estimated by the Israeli government in its recent presentation to us - $910
million. Applying the same definition of "incremental costs" as used in the
development of the U.S. defense request, we could justify only a substantially
smaller amount, and have so indicated to the Israeli government. Even so, this
category of cost would not seem to qualify for the "Desert Shield exemption,"
which applies only to accounts appropriated for U.S. defense (function 050)
Second, for whatever amount might be justified, we would have to fit it
appropriately within the framework either fitting it within the existing budgetary
caps, or offsetting it, or determining that it were subject to the "emergency"
exemption - and doing so in a way that neither set an adverse precedent, nor
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As the statute places the Desert Shield provision as part of the emergency
exception to the appropriations caps, it does not apply to direct spending or
receipts legislation."
2
How can one tell if a provision creates Desert Shield costs? One could argue
that simply designating them as such in statute would bind the President upon
signature of the bill into law." 3 Once again, drafting should make a difference.
Statutory language stating that "Notwithstanding the definition of section
251(b)(2)(D)(ii) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985, the spending provided in section 1 shall be considered Desert Shield costs
within the meaning of that Act," should have the same effect as if the statute
directed the President not to count the spending. If, however, the statute merely
states that "Any spending provided in section 1 is a cost of Desert Shield," the
language leaves the President room to interpret the intent of Congress as merely
rationalizing the expenditure, rather than directing the President not to count the
expenditure. A charitable reading of the statute would yield the result of not
counting the provision, but the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
has made clear his position to the contrary. " 4 Once again, the prudent drafter
should avoid the ambiguity of this option if in doubt as to whether the President
will view an item as a Desert Shield cost.
Section 251(b)(2)(D)(ii) provides a special application of the emergency rule
in section 251 (b)(2)(D)(i). Because section 251 (b)(2)(D)(ii) states that "[tihe costs
for operation Desert Shield are . . . not subject to the defense spending limits,"
one could read the statute to direct that Desert Shield costs result in no adjustment
to the caps at all. The better reading, however, would be to place them in the
statutory scheme of which they are a part. Section 251(b)(2)(D)(ii) also states
that "[t]he costs for operation Desert Shield are to be treated as emergency
funding requirements." The drafters of the Budget Enforcement Act incorporated
the Desert Shield provisions into the emergency paragraph after first considering
modified the enforcement system of the Budget Enforcement Act.
If these tests were not met, the President's senior advisors would have to recommend
that he veto the bill. The basis for so doing would not rest solely on the excessive
amount of the Israeli request. It would rest, also - and fundamentally - on the need
to honor the Budget Agreement; keep U.S. spending under control; maintain the
confidence of financial markets; and help, thereby, to assure that the U.S. economy
returns promptly to job-producing economic growth.
Letter from Director Richard Darman to Chairman Jamie L. Whitten (Mar. 5, 1991). (For discussion
of H.R. 1281, see infra notes 161-188 and accompanying text. For a discussion of H.R. 1282, see
infra notes 151-160 and accompanying text.)
112. The Director's February 5 letter also addressed this point:
Another limitation of the Desert Shield exemption from the caps is that it only applies
to discretionary spending, not to direct or "mandatory" spending. Because of this
limitation, S. 160, for example, would not qualify for the Desert Shield exemption. S.
160 would extend the period of unemployment compensation for separated military
personnel. Expansion of unemployment benefits increases mandatory spending, not
discretionary spending. (And, consistent with the previous point, even if mandatory
programs were exempt - which they are not - a general increase in unemployment
insurance would not qualify for the Desert Shield exemption because its focus would
be far broader than that necessary to qualify as incrementally related to Desert Shield.)
Letter from Richard Darman to Sen. Jim Sasser (Feb. 5, 1991).
113. The drafters of S. 160, referred to by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
supra notes Ill & 112, had this view.
114. See supra note 112.
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a separate paragraph. They thus meant to include its treatment under the umbrella
of treatment for all emergencies. Thus, the Office of Management and Budget
should treat them as adjustments. The Office of Management and Budget has
appeared to take both positions at different times, but appears to have settled
on the correct position.
III. DEFINING EMERGENCIES
One might translate the statutory definition of a budget emergency as
whatever Congress and the President agree is an emergency." 5 This definition,
however, gives participants in the budget process no guidance. The President
should give the statute and its intent full meaning when executing the law. Until
the parties dissolve the relationship they entered into in the budget summit, both
the President and the Congress should abide by the spirit of their contract with
each other. Both should attempt to give the law meaning rather than merely test
the limits of their power under it. To give effect to the spirit and intent of the
statute, the President and the Congress should seek to define "emergency"
consistent with its plain meaning, the statutory scheme, the legislative history,
and precedent under the Budget Enforcement Act.
A. Dictionary Definitions
Dictionary definitions can furnish a starting point for understanding the
intent of Congress in enacting the emergency provisions of the Budget Enforce-
ment Act. Black's Law Dictionary defines "emergency" in six alternatives in-
volving the pressure of time or surprise: "A sudden unexpected happening; an
unforeseen occurrence or condition; perplexing contingency or complication of
circumstances; a sudden or unexpected occasion for action; exigency; pressing
necessity. Emergency is an unforeseen combination of circumstances that calls
for immediate action without time for full deliberation.""16
Black's cites a case "' that quotes the unabridged Webster's Third New
International Dictionary. That dictionary, in relevant part, defines "emergency"
as:
I : an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls
for immediate action <they were far from help when the [emergency] overtook
them>: as a : a pressing need : EXIGENCY <a state of [emergency] existed
during which any help was acceptable> ... c : a usu[ally] distressing event or
condition that can often be anticipated or prepared for but seldom exactly
foreseen <wait until the [emergency] is over, prices will go down then> <an
[emergency] water supply> <[emergency] docking facilities> <[emergency]
crews working to clear the roads> "
115. See Gramm-Rudman-Hollings §§ 251(b)(2)(D)(i) & 252(e), 2 U.S.C. §§ 901(b)(2)(D)(i) &
902(e) (Supp. II 1990); supra text accompanying notes 88 & 89.
116. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 522-23 (6th ed. 1990) (citing State v. Perry, 29 Ohio App. 2d 33,
37, 278 N.E.2d 50, 53 (1972) (quoting, in turn, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(1961))).
117. State v. Perry, 29 Ohio App. 2d 33, 37, 278 N.E.2d 50, 53 (1972).
118. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 741 (1986).
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These and other definitions focus on either the sudden, unforseen nature of
the contingency or the urgent nature of the need in terms of time. 1" 9
B. The Statutory Scheme
Although the statute does not provide a definition of "emergency" as such,
it does supply two means of uncovering meaning. First, it provides an example
of an emergency in Desert Shield costs, which it does define. Second, it provides
context that helps the reader to understand the motivation for including the
emergency exception.
1. Emergency Desert Shield Costs
The statute itself defines the costs of Desert Shield as emergency requirements.
The choice of this one emergency can shed some light on what constitutes an
emergency. Plainly, a state of war would constitute an emergency. Furthermore,
as the drafters of the Budget Enforcement Act designated Operation Desert Shield
as an emergency before hostilities actually broke out, the drafters also indicated
that national defense imperatives short of all-out war also rise to the level of an
emergency. 1
20
As noted above, the law defines "Emergency Desert Shield costs" as "those
incremental costs associated with the increase in operations in the Middle East
and . . . not ... costs that would be experienced by the Department of Defense
as part of its normal operations absent Operation Desert Shield." ' 2' This definition
instructs that all emergency requirements must be increments to normal operations
absent the emergency.
2. Statutory Context
The statutory context also guides discovery of the definition of "emergency."
The emergency exception provides only one of many exceptions designed to hold
the Government harmless for events beyond its control. Notably, the law requires
the President to adjust the deficit targets for up-to-date reestimates of economic
119. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NNTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 407 (1983) ("1 an unforeseen
combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action 2 an urgent need
for assistance or relief <the governor declared a state of [emergency] after the flood>"); WEBSTER'S
NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 444 (3d college ed. 1988) ("a sudden, generally unexpected occurrence or
set of circumstances demanding immediate action"); RANDOM HousE DICTIONARY 636 (2d ed. 1987)
("I. a sudden, urgent, usually unexpected occurrence or occasion requiring immediate action");
AmmRicAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 448 (2d college ed. 1982) ("An unexpected situation or sudden
occurrence of a serious and urgent nature that demands immediate action").
120. On January 16, 1991, the Defense Department transformed Operation Desert Shield into
Operation Desert Storm when the forces representing the coalition of nations opposed to the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait began hostilities with Iraq. No serious question exists among participants in the
budget process as to whether the exception for Desert Shield costs also applies to Desert Storm costs.
The renaming of the operation has spawned an awkward progeny of terms involving parentheses
and slashes, such as "[O]peration Desert Shield (including Operation Desert Storm)" (see, e.g., Pub.
L. No. 102-28, 105 Stat. 161, 161 (1991)), "Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm" (see, e.g., id.),
and "Operation Desert Shield/Storm" (see, e.g., S. REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1991).
(What this last appellation gains in brevity, it loses in awkwardness, evoking images of a rain of
armor among the dunes.) In this article, references to Operation Desert Shield also refer to its
successor Operation.
121. See Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 251(b)(2)(D)(ii), 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2)(D)(ii) (Supp. 11 1990);
supra text accompanying note 108.
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and technical assumptions' 22 and to adjust the discretionary spending caps for
changes in the rate of inflation from that foreseen at the drafting of the Budget
Enforcement Act. 23 Along the same lines, the law provides an opportunity to
suspend much of the enforcement of the system in the event of war or low
economic growth. 24
Each of these provisions involves a logic similar to that for the emergency
exception: The law holds participants in the budget process responsible for the
changes to the system that they create, but holds them harmless for larger forces
such as war and recession beyond their control. Indeed, had the Congress chosen
to declare war on Iraq upon the initiation of hostilities under Operation Desert
Storm, it would have triggered both the emergency Desert Shield costs exception
for the costs of the war as well as the suspension of the enforcement procedures
during the pendency of the war.
2 5
Thus the statutory context can provide a means of limiting applications of
the emergency exception to cases beyond the Government's control. For example,
the Senate Majority Leader, the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, and
the Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee have argued along these lines
when urging that the President designate spending on unemployment insurance
administrative costs as emergency requirements. 126 In their letter, they stated the
interpretation that "[t]he Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 reformulated the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law to prohibit expansion of the structural deficit"
and that "the new law unlinked the requirement for deficit reduction from the
changes in the deficit caused by the economic cycle."' 27 Thus, they argued, the
misfortune caused by exigent economic circumstances falls within the understand-
ing of emergency requirements created by the statutory scheme. 2 Note, as
discussed below, that the President did designate increased funding for unem-
ployment insurance administrative expenses as emergency requirements. 29
C. Legislative History
Participants in the budget process should seek to interpret the intent of
Congress consistent with the legislative history discussed above. 130 As noted above,
during debate on the Budget Enforcement Act, Chairman Byrd cited the examples
of "earthquakes, hurricanes and so forth," pointing to natural "disasters" as
the paradigm of emergency requirements.'
D. Congressional and Administrative Interpretations
1. The Office of Management and Budget's Definition
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget has attempted to
develop neutral principles to narrow the application of the emergency exception.
122. See Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 253(g), 2 U.S.C. § 903(g) (Supp. 11 1990).
123. See id. § 251(b)(1)(B); 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 11 1990).
124. See id. § 258; 2 U.S.C. § 907a (Supp. 11 1990).
125. See id. § 258(b); 2 U.S.C. § 907a(b) (Supp. II. 1990).
126. See Letter from Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, Chairman Jim Sasser, and Chairman
Paul S. Sarbanes to President George Bush (Feb. 25, 1991); infra note 185.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. See infra notes 185-188 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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In his February 5, 1991, letter regarding S. 160, the Director began this definition
process by excluding general and permanent changes in law:
A second requirement of these exemptions is that there must be an "emer-
gency requirement." Bills that provide spending that is not required to meet a
true emergency do not qualify. For example, S. 160 generally and permanently
extends the period of unemployment compensation for all former service members.
This is not a requirement to meet a true emergency. An emergency is usually a
sudden, urgent and unforeseen situation, and not a permanent condition."'
Congress directed the Director to report to the appropriate committees of
Congress on the unfunded costs of dire emergencies caused by floods, droughts,
tornadoes, unemployment, and other disasters in the United States and abroad.,
The Director responded with a report transmitted June 27, 1991, in which he
built on his earlier paragraph to develop a rigorous definition of "emergency
requirement":
For purposes of determining spending provisions that qualify for exemption, the
President uses a definition of an "emergency requirement" that includes the
following elements: the requirement is a necessary expenditure that is sudden,
urgent, and unforseen, and is not permanent. These elements are defined as
follows:
necessary expenditure - an essential or vital expenditure, not one that is merely
useful or beneficial;
sudden - quickly coming into being, not building up over time;
urgent - pressing and compelling need requiring immediate action;
unforseen - not predictable or seen beforehand as a coming need (an emergency
that is part of an aggregate level of anticipated emergencies, particularly when
normally estimated in advance, would not be "unforseen"); and
not permanent - the need is temporary in nature.
In addition, the classification of certain spending as an "emergency" depends
on common sense judgment, made on a case-by-case basis, about whether the
totality of facts and circumstances indicate a true emergency, and about whether
the needs can be absorbed within the existing level of resources available.'
5 '
Note that Director Darman's definition strings together almost all the possible
characteristics of emergency and then requires that an emergency must meet all
of them to qualify under the law. As a matter of meaning and congressional
intent, this definition restricts too much.
In testimony before the House Budget Committee on July 17, 1991, the
Director has indicated an interest in further refining the definition of "emergency"
in a joint paper produced among the Office of Management and Budget and the
132. Letter from Richard Darman to Sen. Jim Sasser (Feb. 5, 1991).
133. See Pub. L. No. 102-55, 105 Stat. 290, 293 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 71, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
3-4 (1991); Office of Management and Budget, Report on the Costs of Domestic and International
Emergencies and on the Threats Posed by the Kuwaiti Oil Fires ii (June 27, 1991). Along similar
lines, see H.R. REp. No. 9, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1991) ("The Committee ... strongly urges
the President to provide the Committee with a cost estimate and official request for dire emergency
funding"); S. REP. No. 43, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1991) ("the Committee expects the [Agriculture]
Department to provide an estimate and a request for funds").
134. Office of Management and Budget, Report on the Costs of Domestic and International
Emergencies and on the Threats Posed by the Kuwaiti Oil Fires ii (June 27, 1991).
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Senate and House Budget Committees.' Later in the same hearing, the Director
listed tightening of the emergency definition among things that he would like to
see done to the budget process in its next revision. 36 The Director thus continues
to seek to use the definition of "emergency" as a means to constrict use of the
exception and constrain participants in the budget process within the limits set
out by the Budget Enforcement Act.
2. Deep Personal Need
In contrast to the Director's attempts to limit the definition of "emergency"
using neutral principles, many members of Congress have followed the second
branch of the dictionary definition - an urgent need'37 - and sought to define
emergencies in terms of the depth of the personal need involved in given situations.
For example, at a July 17, 1991, hearing of the Senate Budget Committee to
hear the testimony of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
Senator Donald Riegle, a senior member of the Committee and an organizer of
Senate efforts to respond to the recession, pressed Director Darman with examples
of workers whose lives had been devastated by unemployment., Similarly, during
135. House Mid-Session Hearings, supra note 24, at 8-9 (statements of Rep. Gradison and Director
Darman).
136. The Director made his statement in response to a question by Congressman Alex McMillan
asking, "Would you care to outline your thoughts on what you think we should do with respect to
extending this basic agreement." Part of the Director's response was:
I think with respect to the definition of emergency, we ought to try to tighten the
definition of emergency the next time we extend this. That there ought still to be an
emergency exemption from caps for the obvious reason that there will be legitimate
emergencies.
But we need to cut down on the occasion for conflict between us and among us by
being a little tighter in the definition of emergency as we go, that that will help.
House Mid-Session Hearings, supra note 24, at 13.
137. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
138. Senator Riegle stated:
Senator Riegle .... I want to go back to the part about when we designate something
an emergency and the problem with unemployment in the country today.
As I am sure you know, the unemployment rate just went up again in the country
and we are now at 7 percent nationally. But let me tell you what is happening out
across the country, and let me just start with my own home State of Michigan.
Now you had a discussion earlier with some other members as to whether or not the
unemployment compensation problem, this part of it and perhaps other parts of it, do
or do not constitute an emergency. It is an emergency, and if you were in this situation
or other people in the administration were in this situation, I think you would understand
it for the emergency that it is.
I am going to give you just two human examples of people that I saw in Michigan
recently that I spoke to. One was an unemployed [United Auto Workers] member,
worked in an auto plant for many years, had an excellent record[], lost his job,
exhausted his unemployment benefits, was qualifying for extended benefits. Those were
pulled out from under him, . . . and he was half-way through a retraining program to
become a medical records specialist. He had no extra money, was living out of his car,
and he had to drop out of that [program].
I do not know what has happened to him since, but presumably he is living, if he
has not found something, and most people in Michigan cannot now, because there are
no extra jobs out there, I assume he is making it the best he can. Maybe he is in a
homeless shelter. I am not sure at the moment where he is.
I saw another fellow out there the other day, with an excellent work record. He had
a group of certificates of accomplishment as a machine tool operator. He was explaining
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a congressional debate on legislation to expand unemployment compensation
benefits, several members of Congress cited pressing personal need to define the
term "emergency."" '
E. Precedent
As noted above, in one sense, the statute defines an emergency as whatever
Congress and the President agree is an emergency.14' Consequently, review of
what the President and the Congress have agreed constituted an emergency
provides the only certain way to define the term.
One can argue that the precedents of what the President and Congress have
designated as an emergency in the past should guide participants in the budget
process in their designations in the future. Even though precedent does not bind
the President and the Congress in the same fashion that legal precedent binds
courts, the same considerations of justice and fairness among different petitioners
apply here in favor of honoring precedent. In a political environment, practice
may shame one party or another into following along to avoid being accused of
favoring one petitioner or class of petitioners over another similarly situated.'
4'
At least one statute has cited similarity with past emergency designations as a
basis for at least one designation.'4 2
In the first year after enactment of the emergency process, Congress enacted
four bills appropriating funding for emergency requirements. In the wake of the
statutory designation of Operation Desert Shield as an emergency, Congress
enacted two bills, as its first supplemental appropriations measures: the Desert
Shield/Desert Storm Supplemental 43 and the Dire Emergency Supplemental.'"
to me he had gotten rid of his car, because he could not afford to maintain his car.
He had already lost his family, because of the financial problems. He was on a
motorcycle, which is the only thing he could afford, and we was down literally to the
pocket change that he had in his pocket.
And he was telling me this story, I would say he was probably 38, he was trim, you
know, he was obviously a very organized fellow. He had this little portfolio of materials
about his past work record, and as he was talking to me, he just literally burst into
tears. He just burst into tears, because he is desperate for work. He is not getting
unemployment compensation benefits, because the extended program has just triggered
off.
So, we have got ... people out there are unemployed, not being called back to
work, benefits have been shut off, desperately need the money, and the money is there
but it is not getting to them. Now, if that is not an emergency, I do not know what is
an emergency.
The Future of the Budget Summit: OMB Mid-Session Review: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Budget, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 248-50 (1991) [hereinafter Senate Mid-Session Hearings].
139. See infra notes 207-208 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
141. Precedent played an important part in debate of efforts to expand unemployment insurance
benefits. See infra notes 202-203 and accompanying text.
142. See Pub. L. No. 102-55, § 502, 105 Stat. 290, 294 (1991) ("Funds made available in this
Act, being ... similar to items in the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Public Law
102-27, and the Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Supplemental Appropriations Act, Public Law
102-28, are off-budget.").
143. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-28, 105 Stat. 161 (Apr. 10, 1991).
144. Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Consequences of Operation Desert Shield/
Desert Storm, Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, Veterans Compensation
and Pensions, and Other Urgent Needs Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-27, 105 Stat. 130 (Apr. 10,
1991).
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The third, the Humanitarian Assistance Supplemental, 145 funded (among other
things) refugees from the conflict. The fourth, the Disaster Relief Supplemental,'4
included a significant component of Desert Shield funding.
Altogether, during the first session of the 102d Congress, Congress and the
President designated $57.9 billion in budget authority and $49.6 billion in outlays
as emergency requirements for fiscal years 1991 and 1992 (using Congressional
Budget Office estimates). 47 Defense spending accounted for all but a small share
of these totals: 94.407o of the budget authority and 94.307o of the outlays. 1" Of
the remainder, 2.00o of the total budget authority and 2.2% of the total outlays
fell within the international category. 149 Domestic discretionary spending ac-
counted for 3.6% of the budget authority and 3.5% of the outlays designated
as emergency requirements. 50
1. Desert Shield/Desert Storm Supplemental
The Desert Shield/Desert Storm Supplemental appropriated $42.6 billion in
budget authority and $31.6 billion in outlays for fiscal year 1991.1 5'1 All of these
amounts fell within the defense category.
The opening language of the Act seeks to bring the bill within the exception
for emergency Desert Shield costs: "For incremental costs of the Department of
Defense and the Department of Transportation associated with operations in and
around the Persian Gulf as part of operations currently known as operation
Desert Shield (including Operation Desert Storm) ... ."15 Other than allusions
such as this to Operation Desert Shield, the Act does not otherwise mention the
emergency designation.' Legislative history makes clear the intent of the drafters
145. Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations From Contributions of Foreign Governments
And/Or Interest for Humanitarian Assistance to Refugees and Displaced Persons In and Around
Iraq as a Result of the Recent Invasion of Kuwait and for Peacekeeping Activities and Other Urgent
Needs Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-55, 105 Stat. 290 (June 13, 1991).
146. Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers for Relief From the Effects of
Natural Disasters, for Other Urgent Needs, and for Incremental Cost of 'Operation Desert Shield/
Desert Storm' Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-229, 105 Stat. 1701 (Dec. 12, 1991).
147. See Congressional Budget Office, FY 1991/1992 Discretionary Appropriations Designated by
the President and the Congress as Emergency Requirements 5 (Jan. 17, 1992).
For a discussion of budget authority and outlays, see supra note 51.
The Office of Management and Budget differs with the Congressional Budget Office over
estimates of the cost of emergency spending on the Export Enhancement Program. While the
Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Dire Emergency Supplemental provided $323 million
in budget authority and outlays for this program, the Office of Management and Budget attributes
no cost to the act's provisions for this program. Consequently, estimates of how much emergency
spending Congress and the President have done will differ by this amount. Compare Congressional
Budget Office, CBO Estimate of Discretionary Emergencies Enacted This Session 3 (summer 1991)
(Congressional Budget Office estimates) with Congressional Budget Office, FY 1991 Discretionary
Appropriations Compared to Spending Limits (June 26, 1991) (Office of Management and Budget
scoring).
148. See Congressional Budget Office, FY 1991/1992 Discretionary Appropriations Designated by
the President and the Congress as Emergency Requirements 5 (Jan. 17, 1992).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Congressional Budget Office, CBO Estimate of Discretionary Emergencies Enacted This
Session 2 (summer 1991); Congressional Budget Office, FY 1991 Discretionary Appropriations
Compared to Spending Limits (June 26, 1991). Congressional Budget Office and Office of Management
and Budget estimates agree.
152. Pub. L. No. 102-28, 105 Stat. at 161.
153. See id.
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to treat all funding in the bill as Desert Shield emergency requirements.' s4
The Act provided budget authority to the Department of Transportation for
Coast Guard expenditures.' The Congress and the President treated these items
as emergency Desert Shield costs even though one might argue that the statutory
definition limits emergency Desert Shield costs to Department of Defense ac-
counts. 
5 6
The Senate Appropriations Committee differed with the House on whether
two items constituted emergency Desert Shield costs.5 7 The Senate Committee
specifically and correctly disapproved of counting as emergency Desert Shield
costs the increase in costs of fuel for Department of Defense activities outside
of forces in the Persian Gulf.' Similarly, the Senate Committee disapproved of
154. The House Appropriations Committee's report on the bill noted: "All funds provided in
this bill are necessary to meet the emergency funding requirements of Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm." H.R. REP. No. 10, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1991). The report went on to state: "These
funds are exempt from the Committee's Section 302(a) allocation." Id. In other words, as directed
by section 606(d)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act (2 U.S.C. § 665e(d)(2) (Supp. II 1990)), as a
consequence of these costs being Desert Shield cost, the Budget Committees would not count these
funds against the Appropriations Committees' allocations under the latest budget resolution.
The Senate Appropriations Committee's report on the bill reviewed the history of the bill in the
context of the emergency provisions.:
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM BACKGROUND
On February 22, the President submitted a supplemental request to provide for the
costs of Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Under the conditions established in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Congress and the executive branch provided that
the incremental costs of Desert Shield/Storm would be considered an emergency. As
defined in that act, emergency requirements are not subject to the ceilings for discre-
tionary spending under the budget summit agreement. Costs for such emergencies may
be submitted as supplemental appropriations requests.
S. REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1991). The Senate report went on to remark of the
President's initial request: "The request stated that funds were for incremental costs through March
31, along with other ancillary costs." Id. at 2. The report also reprinted a Congressional Budget
Office note regarding the relationship of the costs in the bill to the emergency provision in Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings. Id. at 23. The note states: "NOTE: Pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(D)(ii) of the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990;
Public Law 101-508), these funds are not scored against the Committee's allocations." Id. This note
makes the same point as the similar reference in the House report. The Congressional Budget Office
note should have referred, however, to section 25 l(b)(2)(D)(ii) of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (2 U.S.C.
§ 901(b)(2)(D)(ii) (Supp. I 1990), as amended by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990) and section
606(d)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act (2 U.S.C. § 665e(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1990)).
155. Pub. L. No. 102-28, 105 Stat. at 167; H.R. REP. No. 10, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1991);
S. REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1991).
156. See, e.g., supra note 110 and accompanying text. In response, one could argue that the
President and the Congress implicitly agreed to designate these items as emergency requirements
under the general provisions on emergency requirements.
157. Id. at 7-8.
158. Id. at 7. The report stated:
FUEL PRICE INCREASE
The Department of Defense has requested funding to cover increased prices of the
Department's planned (baseline) fiscal year 1991 purchases of fuel, other than fuel
purchased for use by our forces in the Persian Gulf. Thus, our forces in the United
States (and elsewhere) would receive funds from this supplemental appropriation to pay
fuel costs even though they are not actively participating in Desert Shield/Storm
activities. These costs cannot be considered incremental costs directly related to Operation
Desert Shield/Storm. In its bill, the House directed that the amount for fuel price
increases be allocated only to the fuel consumed in direct support of Operation Desert
Shield/Storm, but made no reductions to the Department's request. Accordingly, the
Committee recommends reducing the request by $1,247,000,000. Also, a general pro-
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counting Virginia telephone improvements as emergency Desert Shield costs. 1 9
The conference committee nonetheless chose to treat the telephone improvements
as emergency Desert Shield costs, albeit at a reduced level of funding. 160
2. Dire Emergency Supplemental
The Dire Emergency Supplemental 6' moved through the legislative process
at the same time as the Desert Shield/Desert Storm Supplemental. The Dire
Emergency Supplemental appropriated emergency requirements of $1.6 billion in
budget authority and $1.8 billion in outlays for fiscal year 1991 (using Congres-
sional Budget Office Estimates). 62 The emergency spending fell into each of the
three appropriations categories: The international category received $909 million
in budget authority and $899 million in outlays, the defense category received
$374 million in budget authority and $344 million in outlays, and the domestic
discretionary category received $364 million in budget authority and $511 million
in outlays. '63
Some provisions of the act explicitly designate appropriations as emergency
requirements.'6 More ambiguous language opens title V, regarding military
vision has been added that restricts the Department from obligating any funds appro-
priated in this supplemental for fuel costs other than those incremental costs directly
associated with Desert Shield/Storm operations.
Id. The language to which the report refers survives in the act as section 104 under "GENERAL
PROVISIONS": "None of the funds appropriated to the Persian Gulf Regional Defense Fund shall
be used for fuel price increases." Pub. L. No. 102-28, 105 Stat. at 165. Note, however, that the
joint statement of managers accompanying the conference report on the bill states: "The conferees
agree to include a general provision that would fund costs of price increases for fuel purchased in
fiscal year 1991 only from the Defense Cooperation Account." H.R. REp. No. 30, 102d Cong., Ist
Sess. 6 (1991).
159. S. REP. No. 23, supra note 154, at 7-8. The report states:
TIDEWATER, NORFOLK, VA
The House included an appropriation of $500,000 in operation and maintenance,
Navy, to implement and staff an enhanced telephone system for the Tidewater Family
Services Center. It also included $11,000,000 in operation and maintenance, Defense
Agencies, for improvements in dependent medical care in the Tidewater area, including
an automated health care provider appointment system. While these projects appear to
be worthy of funding in an annual appropriation bill, neither of them is directly
concerned with Operation Desert Shield/Storm and, in the Committee's view, ought
not to be included in this supplemental.
Id.
160. See H.R. REP. No. 30, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1991).
161. Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Consequences of Operation Desert Shield/
Desert Storm, Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, Veterans Compensation
and Pensions, and Other Urgent Needs Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-27, 105 Stat. 130 (1991).
162. Congressional Budget Office, CBO Estimate of Discretionary Emergencies Enacted This
Session 2 (summer 1991). Using Office of Management and Budget scoring, the Dire Emergency
Supplemental appropriated emergency requirements of $1.3 billion in budget authority and $1.4
billion in outlays. Congressional Budget Office, FY 1991 Discretionary Appropriations Compared to
Spending Limits (June 26, 1991).
163. Congressional Budget Office, CBO Estimate of Discretionary Emergencies Enacted This
Session 1-2 (summer 1991). Using Office of Management and Budget scoring yields the same results,
except that the domestic discretionary category received $44 million in budget authority and $191
million in outlays. Congressional Budget Office, FY 1991 Discretionary Appropriations Compared to
Spending Limits (June 26, 1991).
164. See, e.g., Dire Emergency Supplemental tit. 1, 105 Stat. at 130 ("All funds provided under
this title are hereby designated to be 'emergency requirements' for all purposes of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.").
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personnel and veterans' benefits. 6 The titles, enacting clause, and headings of
title I also attest to the emergency designation of portions of the Act.166 Despite
the ambiguity of the statutory language, 67 report language makes clear the intent
of Congress to designate these appropriations pursuant to the provisions of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, rather than despite them.'6
The President's request for supplemental appropriations designated some of
the funding as emergencies.169 The presidentially-designated emergency items
165. The language states:
For emergency expenses necessary for the benefits provided in the Persian Gulf
Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991, . . .not to
exceed $655,000,000 appropriated, to be derived by transfer only by the Secretary of
Defense, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
from current and future balances in the Defense Cooperation Account ....
Id.
166. The Act's full title is "An Act Making dire emergency supplemental appropriations for the
consequences of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, food stamps, unemployment compensation
administration, veterans compensation and pensions, and other urgent needs for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 1991, and for other purposes." Id. The short title of the Act is nearly identical: "Dire
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Consequences of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm,
Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, Veterans Compensation and Pensions,
and Other Urgent Needs Act of 1991." Id. at 160. The enacting clause states: "Be it enacted by the
Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, That
the following sums are appropriated ... to provide dire emergency supplemental appropriations for
the fiscal year ending September 30, 1991, and for other purposes . I..." Id  at 130. The heading
of title I states: "TITLE I - EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS." Id.
167. See supra text accompanying note 98.
168. The House Appropriations Committee report states:
EMERGENCY APPROPRIATIONS
The bill includes language designating all funds provided in Title I of this bill as
"emergency requirements" for all purposes of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended. Under Section 251(b)(2)(D) of that Act,
amounts appropriated for discretionary accounts that are designated as emergency
requirements by the President and by the Congress shall constitute automatic adjustments
to the appropriate Budget Enforcement Act discretionary spending limits.
H.R. REP. NO. 9, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1991). Tables and notes comparing spending in the bill
to allocations also note the effects of the emergency designation. See id. at 59-60; S. REP. No. 43,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1991).
169. The President's request stated in part:
I ask Congress to consider requests for supplemental non-defense appropriations for
[fiscal year] 1991 in the amount of $89,750,000 and amendments to the request for
appropriations for [fiscal year] 1991 in the amount of $4,252,000. Pursuant to section
251(b)(2)(D)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as
amended, I am hereby designating these specific supplemental requests in particular
amounts for [fiscal year] 1991, and these specific amendments to [fiscal year] 1992
requests in particular amounts as emergency requirements.
In addition, I am requesting supplemental appropriations for [fiscal year] 1991 in the
amount of $303,084,000 for the Department of Veterans Affairs and amendments to
the request for appropriations for [fiscal year] 1992 in the amount of 632,200,000 for
the Department of Veterans Affairs and $979,000 for the Institute of Museum Services.
I am also requesting [fiscal year] 1991 and 1992 appropriations language changes for
various Legislative Branch and Executive Branch agencies.
The details of these requests are set forth in the enclosed letter from the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget. I concur with his comments and observations.
THE PRESMENT, supra note 92, at 1 (reprinting Letter from President George Bush to Speaker
Thomas Foley (Feb. 22, 1991)).
The enclosed letter to which the President referred stated (in relevant part):
Submitted for your consideration are requests for emergency [fiscal year] 1991
supplemental appropriations totaling $77,635,000 for various civilian Executive Branch
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included funding for the following non-defense activities related to Operation
Desert Shield: the State Department and related agencies for the Voice of America,
evacuation of employees, security, travel and communications; various law en-
forcement and related agencies to counter terrorism; and the Panama Canal
Commission for increased traffic through the canal.
70
Statutory language makes clear that the motivation for most of the emergency
designations in the Act was "to provide for additional costs resulting from
Operation Desert Shield' 7' Report language supports this link.17 1
agencies. These are in addition to the requests transmitted with your Budget on February
4th, although we hope they may be linked with them in the legislative process. (They
are separate and distinct from the defense supplemental, which we hope to have treated
separately in the legislative process.) In addition, the Legislative Branch requests emer-
gency appropriations of $12,115,000 in [fiscal year] 1991 and $4,252,000 in [fiscal year]
1992.
The transmittal letter to Congress for these non-defense proposals formally designates
them as emergencies. If they are enacted, the budget agreement discretionary spending
limits will be adjusted by the associated amounts. A brief description of each of these
designated emergency proposals follows:
Supplemental appropriations totaling $59,400,000 are requested for the Depart-
ment of State, the Agency for International Development, and the United States
Information Agency. This increase funding would cover emergency expenses for
the evacuation and reassignment of U.S. civilian employees (including contractor
employees), additional broadcasting costs of the Voice of America, increased
security for personnel and facilities, and increased travel and communications
costs.
Supplemental appropriations totaling $7,736,000 are requested for the Department
of Justice to enable the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service to counter the increased treat of terrorism.
Supplemental appropriations totaling $6,934,000 are requested for the Secret
Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) in the Depart-
ment of the Treasury. These increases would cover the costs of additional
protection provided by the Secret Service and explosive training, bomb threat
management and security planning provided by ATF.
A supplemental appropriation of $3,565,000 is requested for the District of
Columbia to cover the costs of additional police protection and security support
in the District.
An increase in obligational authority is requested for the Panama Canal
Commission to pay the costs associated with increased traffic through the canal.
These additional costs would be fully offset by tolls paid by ships using the
canal.
Additional appropriations totaling $12,115,000 for [fiscal year] 1991 and
$4,252,000 for [fiscal year] 1992 are requested by the Legislative Branch. These
increases would cover the costs incurred in providing increased security to the
U.S. Capitol complex.
Id. at 3-4 (reprinting Letter from Director Richard Darman to President George Bush (Feb. 21,
1991)).
170. P.L. No. 102-27, 105 Stat. 130.
171. Almost all of the items in title I follow a form similar to: "For an additional amount for
[a particular purpose] to provide for additional costs resulting from Operation Desert Shield/Operation
Desert Storm, [a particular amount]." Id. at 130-33.
172. The House Appropriations Committee report states:
Overall, the bill as recommended by the Committee provides total new budget authority
of $4,136,377,100. This includes dire emergency appropriations of $151,113,000 which
are primarily to offset the consequences of "Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm"
and $650,000,000 which will assist Israel with costs it has incurred in the Persian Gulf
conflict.
H.R. REP. No. 9, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. I (1991); see also id. at 5-16 (explaining appropriations in
detail); S. RaP. No. 43, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-16 (1991).
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The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended emergency designation
for evacuation of International Trade Administration personnel, criticizing the
administration for designating as emergency requirements the costs of evacuations
that fell within the international category but not similar activities in the domestic
discretionary category. 73 Similarly, the Committee recommended emergency des-
ignation to reimburse the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for
meteorological and oil spill assistance provided in connection with Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 7 4 The administration did not bend, however,
and Congress retreated from the Committee's request for emergency funding.'"
The Senate Appropriations Committee also recommended emergency desig-
nation for veterans' medical care and administration costs resulting from Oper-
ations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 76 The conference committee agreed with
the Senate position on designation.
77
Similarly, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended emergency
funding for student financial assistance for military personnel and veterans. 7 8
173. The Senate Appropriations Committee report states:
The Committee recommends an emergency supplemental appropriation of $310,00 for
evacuation and property damage costs of the U.S. Foreign and Commercial Service
related to Operation Desert Shield/Storm .... These funds would be used for exactly
the same purposes, at the same overseas locations, as those requested by the adminis-
tration for the U.S. Department of State. The Committee fails to understand why the
administration considers such costs to be an emergency when they occur to an agency
funded under the [international] spending cap, but not when they are borne by a
domestic discretionary funded agency like the International Trade Administration.
S. REP. No. 43, supra note 33.
174. See id.
175. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 29, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1991). The joint statement of managers
noted:
The conferees have reluctantly agreed not to include any funding to reimburse
Department of Commerce agencies for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm emergency
expenses. The conferees have not been able to appropriate funds because of the
Administration's inconsistent treatment of the Department of Commerce vis-a-vis other
Executive Branch agencies such as the Department of State, Agency for International
Development, Department of Treasury and the Department of Justice. For example,
the Administration refuses to agree to emergency designation for appropriations for the
International Trade Administration that are for the same purposes and at the same
overseas locations as those requested for the Department of State.
Id.
176. The Committee report states:
[T]he Committee has provided $25,000,000 for veterans medical care.
This includes $3,600,000 for costs incurred for planning and preparation for Operation
Desert Storm; $16,000,000 for costs incurred due to the call up of reservists employed
by the [Veterans' Affairs) medical system; $1,400,000 for posttraumatic stress disorder
treatment. The Committee notes that these additional costs are a direct result of
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
The Committee has provided $12,000,000 for general operating expenses .... Funds
are needed to hire 132 staff in the Veterans Benefits Administration to process new
claims submitted by veterans of Operation Desert Storm.
S. REP. No. 43, supra note 133 at 15-16.
177. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 29, supra note 175, at 10. The joint statement of mangers states:
"The conferees agree that the amount provided in necessary to cover costs that have been and will
be incurred by the [Department of Veterans' Affairs) because of events in the Persian Gulf." Id.
178. The Senate Committee reports states:
The Committee recommends the transfer of $500,000,000 from the Defense Cooper-
ation Account for emergency expenses necessary for military personnel and veterans
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The conference committee added the language in title V of the bill on this
subject.
7 9
The President requested repeal of a cap on the Export Enhancement Pro-
gram.'80 The House Appropriations Committee disagreed with the request.'' The
Senate Appropriations Committee revived the request, placing it among items
designated as emergencies, but without explanation of that emergency designation
in its report.1 2 As the administration did not project any cost from this action,
it might have considered the emergency designation as a matter of less impor-
tance. 3 The conferees agreed to repeal the cap, expressing concerns for producers
of particular agricultural products.'84
The unemployment insurance designation resulted from a negotiation between
members of Congress and the administration. On February 25, the Senate
Majority Leader, the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee and the Chair-
man of the Joint Economic Committee wrote the President calling on him to
designate $200 million in additional unemployment insurance administrative ex-
penses as emergency requirements.8 5 Despite the President's recommendation of
benefits as authorized in S. 578, the defense supplemental authorization bill, for costs
occurring between fiscal year 1991 and fiscal year 1995. In addition, the Committee
recommends emergency appropriations of $30,000,000 for family education and support
services ....
The Committee is well aware of the sacrifices participation in Operation Desert Shield/
Desert Storm demanded, and will continue to demand for some time to come, not only
of military personnel in both the Active and Reserve component[s], but also of their
families. The Committee hopes that these emergency appropriations, intended to provide
additional support during the transition from a wartime footing to peacetime will enable
members of our military to resume their normal lives as quickly as possible.
S. REP. No. 43, supra note 133 at 66.
179. See H.R. REp. No. 29, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 40-44 (1991).
180. See id. at 16.
181. See H.R. REp. No. 9, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1991).
182. See S. RP. No. 43, supra note 133, at 16.
183. For a discussion of scoring of this program, see supra note 147.
184. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 29, supra note 175, at 10-11.
185. The letter states, in part:
We write you today to request that you join with us in recognizing the amount of
the shortfall in funding for the administrative expenses of the Unemployment Insurance
Trust Fund and the emergency nature of the need for [unemployment insurance]
administrative expense funding. Moreover, we urge you to make such an emergency
designation under section 251(b)(2)(D)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985.
We were disappointed and somewhat surprised to find that you requested only $100
million for Unemployment Insurance administrative expenses in your budget submission
to Congress on February 4, in spite of the Department of Labor's projection that the
need for such funds was significantly higher. We were equally disappointed to find that
your request for administrative expenses did not receive an emergency designation.
We would like to request that you increase your supplemental appropriation request
for [unemployment insurance) administrative funds to $200 million to fulfill the Federal
Government's commitment to states. Furthermore, we request that you designate your
request as an "emergency requirement" under the provisions of the recently passed
Budget Enforcement Act to prevent the amount from being counted against the discre-
tionary caps established for the Appropriations Committee in last year's budget summit.
Plainly, an emergency exists. Both the Congressional Budget Office and your own
Office of Management and Budget have certified that the Nation is in a recession.
Unemployment has risen from 5.6 percent in September of last year to the current 6.2
percent. Waits of 4 to 6 weeks for benefit checks are not uncommon in virtually all
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$100 million in funding, the House Appropriations Committee recommended
increasing funding by $200 million, although it did not designate these funds as
emergency requirements. 8 6 The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended
a compromise figure of $150 million, plus language designating the amount as
an emergency."8 7 The conference committee adopted the Senate compromise
funding level and emergency designation.'
3. Humanitarian Assistance Supplemental
The third supplemental appropriations act incorporating emergency funding
also had links to Operation Desert Shield. The Humanitarian Assistance
regions of the United States. In Indiana 17 local offices were closed and 100 staff were
laid off as a result of last year's administrative fund shortfall while the number of
claims increased from 29,670 per week in October to 57,330 in December of last year.
In many states, increased workload and decreased staff result in waiting lines of up to
6 hours. On several occasions in the District of Columbia, staff have been forced to
turn people away, asking them to return another day. In one local office in Maine, the
backlog caused such delays that the fire marshall forced some of those waiting to leave.
In New York last year, an estimated $4.5 million in tax revenues was lost due to
redeployment of tax staff to handle the backlog in [unemployment insurance] claims
activities. The list goes on and on.
Section 251(b)(2)(D)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) as amended by section 13101 of the Budget En-
forcement Act of 1990 sets forth a procedure to address emergency funding requirements
such as this. That section provides that if the President and the Congress each designate
appropriations as emergency requirements, then the discretionary spending limits shall
be adjusted to allow for legislation to respond to the emergency. We stand ready to
move legislation that would so designate the administrative expenses of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Trust Fund as emergency requirements. We invite you to write the
Congress to join us in making this designation.
Designating funding for the administrative expenses of the Unemployment Insurance
Trust Fund as an exception to the spending caps of the new law is consistent with the
intent of that law. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 reformulated the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings law to prohibit expansion of the structural deficit. The new law
recognized that the economic cycle will expand and contract the deficit, and the new
law unlinked the requirement for deficit reduction from the changes in the deficit caused
by the economic cycle. The same logic applies to the administrative expenses of the
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund. They rise and fall with the economic cycle, and
the spirit of the new law calls for the Government to fund them fully without cutting
other needed Government services as an offset.
The new law focuses on controlling actions that the Congress and the President take
to worsen the deficit. The new law generally holds Congress and the President harmless
for the effects on the deficit of events outside their control. As much as leaders would
like to be able to engineer the economy, factors beyond the control of the Government
determine the amount of money needed to fund the administrative expenses of the
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund.
Americans overwhelmingly agree that support for our armed forces in the Persian
Gulf rises to the level of an emergency requirement. By the same token, however, the
recession dominating the home front has created an emergency right here in our own
country. Please join with us, Mr. President, in combatting this emergency.
Letter from Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, Chairman Jim Sasser, and Chairman Paul S.
Sarbanes to President George Bush (Feb. 25, 1991).
186. H.R. REp. No. 9, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 33 (1991).
187. The Senate Committee report sheds little light on how it made the decision with regard to
the emergency designation. "The Committee has added bill language indicating that funding for this
program shall be designated 'emergency requirements' for the purposes of budget scoring pursuant
to the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended." S. REp. No. 43,
supra note 133, at 38.
188. See H.R. Cony. REP. No. 29, supra note 175, at 25. The joint statement of managers offers
little explanation. See supra note 187.
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Supplemental s9 funded emergency requirements of $572 million in budget au-
thority and $415 million in outlays for fiscal year 1991 .90 The emergency spending
fell into the international and defense categories: The defense category received
$337 million in budget authority and $269 million in outlays and the international
category received $236 million in budget authority and $148 million in outlays.'
Although the Act includes language referring to emergencies and Desert
Shield Costs,'9 the operative language designating the emergency simply directs
how to estimate the costs of the Act, notwithstanding the requirements of the
Budget Enforcement Act. 93 The Act provides: "Funds made available in this
Act, being incremental costs of 'Operation Desert Storm' or offset, similar to
items in the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Public Law 102-
27, and the Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Supplemental Appropriations
Act, Public Law 102-28, are off-budget."' 1 To the extent that the Act's funding
amounts to international assistance rather than incremental costs of the United
States defense effort in the Middle East, the Act stretches the boundaries of the
emergency Desert Shield costs exception.
4. Extended Unemployment Insurance Benefits
In addition to the appropriations measures, Congress passed another bill
that includes an emergency designation, although the President chose not to join
in the designation. Action on this measure, a bill to provide extended unemploy-
ment insurance benefits, highlights the differing views of what constitutes an
emergency. On July 24, 1991, Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Chairman of the Finance
Committee, introduced S. 1554, the first unemployment insurance bill on which
Congress would act in the 102d Congress.' 9' The Finance Committee reported
out the bill by a vote of sixteen to four, beating down a series of amendments. '9
When the Majority Leader sought to proceed to the bill, the Republican leadership
exercised its rights under the Senate rules to delay consideration,'9 and threatened
189. Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations From Contributions of Foreign Governments
And/Or Interest for Humanitarian Assistance to Refugees and Displaced Persons In and Around
Iraq as a Result of the Recent Invasion of Kuwait and for Peacekeeping Activities and Other Urgent
Needs Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-55, 105 Stat. 290 (June 13, 1991); (H.R. 2251, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991)).
190. Congressional Budget Office, CBO Estimate of Discretionary Emergencies Enacted This
Session 3 (Summer 1991); Congressional Budget Office, FY 1991 Discretionary Appropriations
Compared to Spending Limits (June 26, 1991). Congressional Budget Office and Office of Management
and Budget estimates agree.
191. Congressional Budget Office, CBO Estimate of Discretionary Emergencies Enacted This
Session 2-3 (Summer 1991); Congressional Budget Office, FY 1991 Discretionary Appropriations
Compared to Spending Limits (June 26, 1991). Once again, Congressional Budget Office and Office
of Management and Budget estimates agree.
192. Note the title, the enacting clause, and interspersed references to Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm. See Pub. L. No. 102-55, 105 Stat. 290, 290-91 (1991).
193. See Pub. L. No. 102-55, § 502, 105 Stat. 290, 294 (1991).
194. Id.
195. S. 1554, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. S10,781-85 (daily ed. July 24, 1991). Senators
Bradley, Mitchell, Sasser, Breaux, Packwood, Seymour, Chafee, Riegle, Specter, Metzenbaum,
Rockefeller, Mikulski, and Sarbanes joined as original cosponsors.
196. See 137 CONG. REc. D972 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (ordered reported); id. at Sll,056 (daily
ed. July 26, 1991) (reported).
197. See 137 CoNG. REC. S10,934-35 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (Republican Leader Dole questions
the need for the legislation); id. at S1I,052 (daily ed. July 26, 1991) (Majority Leader Mitchell asks
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a lengthy tax debate. 98 The Senate considered the bill on August 1, just before
its summer recess, approving it on a voice vote.' 99 The next day, the House of
Representatives considered and passed a bill, H.R. 3201, that was substantially
identical to the Senate bill, by a vote of 375 to 45. 200 The Senate passed the
House bill by unanimous consent later that day.
201
Many Members of Congress argued that the precedents for emergency
designation supported designating this case as an emergency requirement. 20 2 In
unanimous consent to proceed to S. 1554, that a cloture motion on the motion to proceed be deemed
to have been filed, and that the cloture vote occur not earlier than July 29, 1991); id. at Si 1,191-92
(daily ed. July 29 1991) (Senate votes 96 to 1 to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed to S. 1554);
id. at SlI,193 (daily ed. July 29, 1991) (Majority Leader Mitchell asks unanimous consent that the
30 hours of debate allowed on the motion to proceed to the bill under the cloture rule be deemed
to have elapsed upon the convening of the Senate on July 31, 1991, and that the motion to proceed
then be deemed agreed to, and that a cloture motion on the bill then be deemed to have been filed);
id. at SI 1,397, SI 1,408 (daily ed. July 31, 1991) (statements of Majority Leader Mitchell & Republican
Leader Dole).
198. Republican Senators filed 35 amendments to qualify them under the cloture rules. 137 Cong.
Rec. Sl1,234 (daily ed. July 29, 1991) (Kasten amendment, no. 887); id. at Si1,239-47 (Kasten
amendment, no. 911); id. at S11,381-82 (daily ed. July 30, 1991) (Kasten amendment, no. 945); id.
at Sl1,590-91 (daily ed. Aug.l, 1991) (Gorton amendment, no. 951); id. at S11,591-92 (Mack
amendment, no. 953); id. at S11,855-56 id. at S11,856 (Dole amendment, no. 982); id. at S11,856
(Dole amendment, no. 983); id. at SII,856 (Dole amendment, no. 984); id. at S11,856 (Dole
amendment, no. 985); id. at S11,856 (Dole amendment, no. 986); id. at SII,856 (Dole amendment,
no. 987); id. at S11,856-57 (Dole amendment, no. 988); id. at S11,857-58 (Dole amendment, no.
989); id. at Sll,858-59 (Dole amendment, no. 990); id. at Si,859 (Domenici amendment, no. 991);
id. at S11,859-60 (Domenici amendment, no. 992); id. at S11,860 (Kasten amendment, no. 993); id.
at S11,860-74 (Hatch amendment, no. 995); id. at SI1,874 (Mack amendment, no. 996); id. at SI 1,874
(Hatch amendment, no. 997); id. at S11,874 (Hatch amendment, no. 998); id. at S11,874 (Hatch
amendment, no. 999); id. at S11,875 (Gramm amendment, no. 1003); id. at Si1,875-76 (Gramm
amendment, no. 1004); id. at S11,876 (Gramm amendment, no. 1005); id. at Si,876-77 (Gramm
amendment, no. 1006); id. at S11,877 (Gramm amendment, no. 1007); id. at SIi,877-78 (Gramm
amendment, no. 1008); id. at S11,878 (Gramm amendment, no. 1009); id. at Sii,878-82 (Gramm
amendment, no. 1010); id. at S11,882-86 (Gramm amendment, no. 1011); id. at SI1,886-97 (Gramm
amendment, no. 1012); id. at S11,897-905 (Kasten amendment, no. 1013); id. at S11,906-12 (Dole
amendment, no. 1018). Democrats also filed six amendments. Id. at Si,874-75 (Kohl amendment,
no. 1000); id. at Sl1,875 (Kohl amendment, no. 1001); id. at S11,875 (Kohl amendment, no. 1002);
id. at S11,905-06 (Metzenbaum amendment, no. 1014); id. at S11,906 (Kennedy amendment, no.
1015); id. at S1i,906 (Fowler amendment, no. 1016).
199. See 137 Cong. Rec. S11,727-57 (daily ed. Aug. 1 1991).
200. See id. at H6354 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991).
201. See id. at S12,032-36.
202. See, e.g., Senate Mid-Session Hearings, supra note 138, at 249-55 (statements of Sen. Riegle,
including: "Let me tell you some of the emergencies we have funded already this year. There is an
emergency situation for the Kurdish people. We made an emergency designation there and we are
sending them money. An emergency designation for Egypt, we are sending them money. Turkey, we
are sending them money. The Sudan, we are sending them money .... You are helping every country
in the world, in my view, except our own, and you are using the procedures, the emergency procedures
to get money out there to those other countries and you are not willing to help our own unem-
ployed .... I think it is outrageous."); 137 CoNG. REc. S11,192 (daily ed. July 29, 1991) (statement
of Senate Finance Comm. Chairman Bentsen: "I understand the administration does not consider
this an emergency. But they did consider it an emergency when they wanted help for the Kurds;
when they wanted help for the Turks; when they wanted help for the Israelis, and the Congress went
along. We thought that was justified. What we are asking now is for this administration to go along
with us in looking after the unemployed in this country."); id. at SI 1,732 (statement of Sen. Bentsen:
"Earlier this year, the President asked Congress to pass emergency legislation providing assistance
to the Kurds, the Israelis, the Turks and others whose circumstances he felt merited our concern and
compassion. We agreed with the President and joined him in declaring an emergency. Now, we're
asking the President to join us in recognizing that American workers also need our help in time of
trouble."); id. at Sil,733 (daily ed. Aug. 1991) (statement of Sen. Dodd); id. at Sii,748 (statement
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response, some Senators and Congressmen engaged their colleagues on this playing
field, seeking to distinguish prior precedents, either because the need had been
greater or because they had been paid for. 203 The Senate Republican Leader also
of Sen. Byrd); id. at S11,749 (statement of Chairman Bentsen); id. at S11,752 (statement of Budget
Comm. Chairman Sasser); id. at S11,754 (statement of Sen. Baucus: ". . . I hope that President
Bush will recognize that the plight of the unemployed in this Nation is as important as the plight of
the Kurdish refugees. The President should join us in helping those still feeling the impact of an
economic recession. Of course, there is a cost to this, just as there was a cost to our aid to the
Kurds. But both are emergencies and the budget should treat them as such. We shouldn't have one
threshold for foreign emergencies - which says you don't have to offset the cost - and another
standard[] for the unemployed in this country - which says you don't get benefits unless some other
program is cut."); id. at H6201 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991) (statement of Rep. Kennedy); id. at H6320
(daily ed. Aug. 2 1991) (statement of Rep. Traficant); id. at H6326 (statement of Rep. Wise); id. at
H6327 (statement of Rep. Pelosi); id. at H6328 (statement of Rep. Schroeder comparing the emergency
designation more broadly to emergency items and other items excluded from the deficit calculations
under the Budget Enforcement Act); id. at H6329 (statement of Rep. Bonoir); id. at H6333 (statement
of Rep. Wise, citing how both prior and the instant emergencies could lead to similar human
hardships); id. at H6334 (statement of Rep. Hayes of Illinois, same); id. at H6336 (statement of
Rep. Wolpe); id. at H6339 (statement of Rep. Hoyer: "For a man with such purported vision, it is
clear he is farsighted. Emergencies in Bangladesh and Kurdistan are clear as day to him, but
emergencies close at home are blurred and indiscernible."); id. at H6340 (statement of Rep. Kaptur,
criticizing the President's foreign priorities more generally, but making clear that she thought of
cases, among others, in which the President had previously designated emergencies); id. at H6342
(statement of Rep. Stokes: "If the President can find an emergency in Kuwait, or in Kurdistan, what
about Cleveland?"); id. at H6342 (statement of Rep. Smith of Florida); id. at H6343 (statement of
Rep. Foglietta: "Dramatic changes in our economy - like defense cutbacks - and the recession
have prompted an emergency here at home, just like there were emergencies with the Kurds and in
Bangladesh."); id. at H6346 (statement of Rep. DeLauro: "How can the President fly around the
world offering economic assistance to foreign lands while refusing to acknowledge the desperate need
for such assistance in his own back yard?"); id. at H6346 (statement of Rep. Kildee: "Mr. Chairman,
recently our Nation has generously provided assistance to the Kuwaiti people, the Kurdish people,
the Bangladeshi people, Filipino people - now it is time to help the American people."); id. at
H6348 (statement of Rep. Fazio: "We are past the halfway mark of George Bush's term and his
accomplishments read more like a Secretary of State's than a President's. It's time to come home,
Mr. President. It's time to help our own."); id. at H6348 (statement of Rep. Olver: "If President
Bush can declare an emergency to provide aid to Kurdish refugees, why can't we declare an emergency
to help the unemployed men and women in my district and in our country?"); id. at H6348 (statement
of Rep. Ford of Michigan); id. at H6350 (statement of Rep. Coyne); id. at H6353 (statement of
Majority Leader Gephardt: "The President can see suffering overseas but not when it is happening
right before his eyes."); id. at E2925 (statement of Rep. Wise, entering into the Congressional Record
a statement citing past emergencies); id. at S12,032-33 (statement of Majority Leader Mitchell: "The
President gays this is not an emergency. But when people in Iraq needed help, the President said it
was an emergency. When people in Turkey needed help, the President said it was an emergency.
When people in Israel needed help, the President said it was an emergency. When Americans need
help, the President says it is not an emergency. We disagree."); id. at S12,035 (statement of Majority
Leader Mitchell: "There is no disagreement that Members of Congress wanted to and supported
helping people in Iraq, people in Turkey, people in Israel, and people in Bangladesh. The point is
that no one then said this is a problem with the deficit. No one then said this is not an emergency.
The problem is that only when we want to help Americans does this question come up about the
deficit and the breaking the budget agreement .... The budget agreement ... specifically established
a procedure for the declaration of emergencies and, pursuant to that procedure, emergencies were
declared with the President's full support and support of Congress for help to the people in Iraq,
for help to the people in Turkey, for help to the people in Israel. All we are saying is that Americans
ought to get the same treatment that the American Government gave to people in other countries.").
203. See 137 CONG. REc. S11, 750 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991) (statement of Republican Leader
Dole: 'With regards to the chairman's comments about the emergency declaration for the Kurds -
the $336 million for the Kurds did not come out of the U.S. Treasury. It was financed out of interest
on Desert Storm funds. I also don't think I need to remind the chairman of those pictures of literally
thousands of people huddled together dying from disease, exposure, and starvation. In connection
with the funds for Turkey and Israel, let's not forget the economic havoc wreaked on their economies
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noted that the Congress - not just the President - had sought to designate
emergencies in the precedents.3 Opening House debate on the bill, the Chairman
of the Committee on Ways and Means expressed his understanding of how
Members might base an emergency designation on precedent, but noted how he
considered this action taken in reliance on precedent to be an exceptional case. 25
Members also argued (using the second of the two dictionary definitions of
"emergency ' ' 206) that the urgent human need of the unemployed amounted to an
emergency. 20n Chairman Bentsen, for example, came close to setting forth an
as a result of the Persian Gulf war and the support they gave us during that extremely important
effort."); id. at H6338 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991) (statement of Ways and Means Comm. Ranking
Republican Member Archer: "But what is an emergency? The majority is arguing that the President
and Congress have declared a host of emergencies already. Reference is then made to all manner of
disasters all over the world. In fact, however, Congress and the administration have used the
emergency clause of the Budget Act to exempt a total of only $1 billion from Budget Act provisions.
This money has been used for three purposes: First, $236 million for disaster assistance to Kurds
and others affected by Desert Storm; Second, $59 million to protect and evacuate Americans from
the Persian Gulf region; and Third, $850 million for Israel and Turkey to help them defray costs
incurred in supporting the United States in Iraq. None of the other emergencies cited by Democrats
were paid for by exemptions from the Budget Act; they were paid for by emergency funds set aside
for such purposes by various domestic and foreign aid programs and they still counted against the
budget spending totals."); id. at S12,036 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole: "Also, I
would say aid to Bangladesh came from United States international disaster assistance accounts
specifically earmarked for such purposes and did not increase the deficit. In addition, the aid to the
Kurds, which we were all concerned about, and urging the administration to do more, actually came
from interest on funds we had received from our coalition partners. Again, the use of such funds
did not have any impact on the deficit whereas the Bentsen proposal would require the Government
to sell almost $6 billion more in bonds to pay for the bill.").
204. See 137 CONG. Rac. S12,033 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole, "... I have
to believe that there were a lot of Members of Congress asking for aid to Israel, asking for aid for
Turkey, asking for aid to help the stricken people in Bangladesh, where 125,000 people lost their
lives in a very cataclysmic tragedy there, and in Ethiopia where people were starving to death. We
were asking - Congress was asking - not just the President. It was not just the President who
declared that an emergency.").
205. Chairman Rostenkowski said:
By my count, we have on four occasions this year declared an emergency and bypassed
the pay-go requirements of the Budget Enforcement Act. In each of these instances, we
did it at the President's request. Given this pattern of Presidentially initiated emergencies,
I can understand why a majority of my colleagues believe this bill should also qualify
for an emergency designation. Many Members are frustrated with the apparent willing-
ness to declare emergencies to help citizens of foreign countries, while ignoring equally
compelling emergencies at home.
However, I want to emphasize to my colleagues that I view this bill as an exception.
I will continue to insist on pay-as-you-go financing for future legislation which increases
spending or which reduces revenue.
Id. at H6337.
206. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
207. See 137 CONG. REc. S11,736 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991) (statement of Sen. Finance Comm.
Ranking Republican Member Senator Packwood: "You are out of work through no fault of your
own. You are willing to work; as a matter of fact, your employer wants you to work.... But for
a variety of reasons involving no fault of yours . . . you are laid off. And, for you, that is an
emergency. You only have one car between you and you owe payments on it. You own a house ...
and you owe payments on it .... So if you are Jim or Sally, in this job at the mill, this is an
emergency .... "); id. at S11,736 (statement of Sen. Riegle); id. (statement of Sen. Sarbanes); id.
at S11,737 (statement of Sen. Dodd: "But I think the President also needs to understand, Mr.
President, that we need emergency relief for an awful lot of people in this country, who have never
been out of work before, who find themselves tonight for the first time collecting pink slips with
obligations on home mortgages, college education, automobiles, basic necessities to meet."); id. at
S11,749 (statement of Finance Committee Chairman Bentsen: "I would like to see any Member of
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alternative set of criteria by arguing that the need of the unemployed was "real,"
"serious," and "urgent." 20 8 The Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee
compared the urgent human needs of the unemployed to the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget's definition of "emergency." 2°9
An unusual coalition of Members criticized the bill from both the left and
the right for failing to pay for itself, either implicitly or explicitly questioning
the appropriateness of the emergency designation or the emergency procedure
altogether. 210 As a consequence, some of these Senators (chief among them the
this Senate or the OMB or administration try to explain to the family of an unemployed worker,
whose benefits have run out, who is having a tough time meeting the payments on the car so he can
go out and look for work, tell him or her that it is not an emergency. These needs are real, they
are serious, and they are urgent."); id. at S11,754 (statement of Sen. Baucus: "Losing a job is
traumatic. Not finding another is worse. And when you're about to lose your unemployment benefits,
it's a real emergency. You fear losing your car. You fear losing your house. Most of all, you fear
losing your self respect. This bill will be a short-term help for the young unemployed father who
has a family depending on him for food and housing and clothing, while he looks for work. This
bill will help, for a few weeks, the woman supporting a family on her own who has lost her job
and has no other source of income. Mr. President, those are emergencies as real as any this Nation
might face. And behind each emergency there are real people who are suffering. I have talked to
many Montanans in recent months, and I know that many people still face hard times. They aren't
only worried about how to pay for their child's college education or how to buy a new car; they are
worried about how to pay for their family's next meal and how to make sure there is a bed for their
children to sleep in."); id. at H6329 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991) (statement of Rep. Bonoir: "I say, 'If
you have no income for your family, you cannot pay bills, you can't pay rent, you can't pay
mortgages, you can't put food on the table for hungry kids.' That, Mr. Speaker, is an emergency.");
id. at H6334 (statement of Rep. Hayes: "Talk to any family that has exhausted their 26 weeks of
benefits and they will ask: How will I pay the rent? How will I make the car payment? How will I
clothe the children? Imagine the frustration and despair that the working fathers and mothers endure
when they cannot provide food or shelter for their children, or must choose between medicine or
other bare necessities."); id. at H6343 (statement of Rep. Foglietta: "Unemployed Americans have
families to feed and mortgages to pay."); id. at H6345 (statement of Rep. Lowey: "[S]tatistics alone
do not accurately reflect the level of misery and suffering that is being experienced by many American
families."); id. at H6346 (statement of Rep. DeLauro: "These are not just statistics. Each one of
these numbers represents a human being whose life has been turned inside out, They represent
families who are losing the struggle to afford the basic essentials."); id. at H6350 (statement of Rep.
Coyne: "These men and women are facing a true emergency and hard choices on how to feed their
children and pay their rent or mortgages.").
208. 137 CONG. REC. S11,749 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991).
209. Id. at S1I,753 (statement of Budget Committee Chairman Sasser: "To those who question
whether unemployed Americans face an emergency, I would direct you to the States that have been
abruptly ejected from the unemployment system - States whose residents have been told that no
more extended benefits checks will be coming. Go to West Virginia, where the unemployment rate
nears 10 percent, and tell the hard-pressed families of that rugged State that their unemployment
checks are not essential. Go to Oregon, where the checks have stopped. Tell them their problem is
not urgent. Tell the worker in Michigan that he should have foreseen being unemployed for more
than 6 months. And tell the working families of Maine that when the extended benefits system stops
working for them, tell them the loss of that income will not be shocking and sudden.").
210. See id. at S11,148-9 (daily ed. July 29, 1991) (statement of Sen. Mack: "The plan proposed
in the Senate is again that kind of liberal thought that just says, 'Go ahead and extend the benefits;
do not worry about how you are going to pay for it."'); id. at S1I,737 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Simon); id. at SII,747 (statement of Budget Committee Ranking Republican
Member Domenici); id. at SII,751 (statement of Sen. Simpson: "Under the budget agreement, we
are supposed to find a way to pay for programs that increase the budget deficit - even the worthy
ones. Well, the proponents point out, there is a provision in the Budget Act that permits the President
to get around the pay-as-you-go-rules by declaring something an emergency. That is not quite honest
in this situation. Mr. President, the last time we enacted a special, supplemental unemployment
benefit our unemployment rate was over 10 percent. We discontinued that program when the rate
fell to just over 7 percent. Now, when the unemployment rate is below the cutoff, and when the
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Republican Leader) argued that the bill violated the summit agreement. 2" Some
of these Members apparently argue that Congress can only utilize the emergency
exception without breaking the budget agreement in cases where it would not
increase the deficit. Although the statutory exception for emergency Desert Shield
costs would fit into that category, neither the statute nor its legislative history
support so narrow an application of the emergency exception.
The Chairman of the Budget Committee countered the accusation that the
bill broke the summit agreement, arguing that the summit agreement contemplated
exactly this kind of use of the emergency exception, stating that recession was
one of the three contingencies - along with war and natural disasters - that
negotiators had explicitly considered during negotiations on the budget summit.212
economy is on its way back, the proponents of the original bill want to declare an emergency rather
than find an honest way to pay for these new benefits."); id. at H6327 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991)
(statement of Rep. Armey); id. at H6337 (statement of Chairman Rostenkowski: "My colleagues
know I am a strong supporter of the pay-as-you-go requirements enacted in last year's budget
agreement. I am very disappointed that the bill is not adequately financed. I would have preferred
to give the President the choice to allow the taxes necessary to finance the benefits to go into effect,
as Tom Downey and I proposed in the introduced bill, or to designate the benefits as an emergency
and to forego the taxes. I am very disappointed that the committee did not agree with this approach.");
id. (statement of Rep. Archer: "Although it does not raise taxes, it will nonetheless require increased
taxes in the future. The emergency procedures allow us to pretend money is not being spent, but
every dollar still shows up in the deficit. The bill will come due one day.") id. at H6339 (statement
of Rep. Shaw); id. at H6340 (statement of Rep. Pease); id. at H6343 (statement of Rep. Spratt); id.
at H6345 (statement of Rep. Lowey of New York); id. at H6349 (statement of Rep. Ford of
Michigan); id. at S12,035 (statement of Sen. Gorton).
211. Republican Leader Dole said:
I believe that there are some significant flaws in the Bentsen proposal. First of all,
it breaches the budget agreement. I want to thank the Presiding Officer, Senator SIMoN,
for indicating there ought to be a better way to take care of the benefits. If we are
going to have benefits, we ought to pay for the benefits.
That is the very point this Senator made in the markup. It is not that we do not
want to help the unemployed; it is that we do not want to hurt the unemployed and
other Americans by running up the deficit by about $6 billion. This bill sidesteps the
budget agreement which, as we all know, took a lot of work and a lot of commitment.
We voted for that agreement, and now we say, oh well, that was last year. The
Bentsen bill tries to say that we can violate the budget agreement because we are only
taking from trust funds. Well, Mr. President, these trust funds, including the trust fund
the Bentsen proposal taps into, were counted in the budget agreement.
137 CONG. REc. S11,744 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991). See also id. at S12,033 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Dole: "While well intentioned, the Bentsen proposal increases the deficit by almost
$6 billion - breaching the budget agreement approved on a bipartisan basis last year.... We talked
about an emergency. I understand in most cases whenever you have an emergency you dial 911. If
you have an emergency dial 911. Well, in this case, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, are
really dialing 1-800 DEFICIT - that's D-E-F-I-C-I-T - which is a wrong number in my book.").
212. Senator Sasser said:
Far from being a violation of the budget summit agreement, as some have urged, as
a participant in those negotiations, as one who shepherded that budget agreement
through this body, I want to say that this is something that was contemplated under
the budget agreement. And whether or not the President exercises the emergency power
that the Congress is giving him I think will represent a critical test of whether or not
this budget agreement is flexible enough to survive, is flexible enough to meet the needs
of the American people.
137 CONG. REC. S11,737 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991). Later, Senator Sasser continued:
There can be little doubt that an expansion of unemployment insurance conforms
exactly with the definition of a circumstance requiring an emergency designation under
the terms of the 1990 summit agreement.
Far from violating the summit agreement, this proposal employs the flexibility we
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Similarly, the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, Congressman Panetta
of California,213 and Congressman Smith of Florida"4 both asserted that the bill
did not breach the budget agreement. Congressman Downey responded to the
point generally by noting that Republicans opposed both the spending without
taxes to pay for it and the spending with the taxes to pay for it.
2
11
The Ranking Republican Members of the Senate Budget Committee and the
House Ways and Means Committee questioned the emergency designation as an
uncontrollable loophole.
1 6
intentionally wrote into the new law. It is exactly the kind of exception to the system's
rigid constraints that we made room for.
At the summit, we deliberately constructed a limited safety valve - a pressure release
- that grants budget flexibility in time of crisis.
We went even further. We explicitly considered recession as one of the three circum-
stances - along with war and natural disasters - that would warrant invoking the
emergency option.
Id. at S11,753.
213. See 137 CONG. REc. H6341 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991).
214. See CONG. REc. H6343.
215. See CoNG. REc. H6339 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991) ("And you have the temerity to stand up
here and tell us that the bill is weak because we do not pay for it, and you oppose the tax. And
then when we decide not to have the tax, you say there is no emergency.").
216. Senator Domenici stated:
At the summit, we said if the President and Congress agree that there is an emergency,
then you do not have to pay as you go. You can break the budget and spend, and it
does not count.
Well, I submit tonight, what is being attempted, is to say we are not interested in
getting the President's concurrence. We are sending him a bill, and the bill is going to
say in it, we are not paying for this. And if you declare it an emergency, Mr. President,
then it goes into effect under the emergency clause.
I submit that there really is no budget agreement left, because Congress can decide
every time they want something new; that they will send it to the President and say,
we think it is an emergency, if you agree, there is no budget limitation.
[IJf you want to start using the emergency clause this way, I believe you have
every opportunity to ignore the budget resolution, the appropriation caps, and send
him [the President] freestanding spending bills, and put the emergency in his lap and
say, if you do declare it, we spend it; if you do not, it is not an emergency. And that
becomes the end of the budget resolution and the 5-year agreement.
Id. at S11,748 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991).
Congressman Archer stated:
Mr. Chairman, there is widespread agreement in the Nation that the most important
issues before Congress has been and continues to be the Federal budget deficit. The
most recent in a long line of attempts to reduce the deficit is last year's Budget
Enforcement Act, enacted after one of the most bitter and divisive legislative struggles
in recent history.
The fundamental problem addressed by the Budget Act, as well as by the earlier
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law, is how to control Federal spending. After four decades
of unrelenting growth in Federal spending and taxes, most Members of Congress came
to realize that the desire to spend would always exceed the political ability to tax. From
this realization, it was a short step to concluding that Congress, lacking discipline and
will, had to figure out some device by which it could automatically control its urge to
spend.
Under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings that device was sequestration. Though the Budget
Act retained sequestration as one of its control devices, the major new devices for
controlling the deficit were spending caps for military, domestic discretionary, and
foreign discretionary programs and the so-called pay-go requirement that any expansion
of entitlement programs must be completely paid for by tax increases or cuts in other
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The Senate Republican Leader proposed an alternative amendment that
provided fewer benefits and did not designate an emergency but provided an
offset - primarily through auction of the electromagnetic spectrum and loan
collection reforms - to at least partly compensate for the expenditure.21 7 Both
the Republican Leader and the administration argued that the recovery was
underway .21  The Senate rejected the Dole amendment 219 and passed the bill by
a voice votes. 20
President Bush announced his intention to sign the measure but not designate
the emergency at a news conference for Maine reporters on Friday, August 16.
President Bush cited two, somewhat contradictory reasons: first, that the bill's
spending would "bust the budget," and second, that the bill's spending was not
needed because, with regard to unemployment, "things are getting better."
'22
entitlement programs.
As it now turns out, the Budget Act's attempt to put Congress on automatic pilot
contained a potential seed of self-destruction. Reasoning that war, pestilence, depression,
and similar calamities might require spending above the forecasted amounts, Congress
inserted a provision that if the President and Congress agreed that an emergency was
at hand, new money could be spent without counting it against the caps or the pay-go
requirement.
In my view, Congress and the administration must be extremely responsible and use
the emergency escape valve to violate spending caps only in the most dire emergencies.
Our current unemployment situation, though serious, has no risen to a level which
justifies the complete restructuring of the extended benefits program contained in this
bill.
This bill violates last year's Budget Enforcement Act in one important respect. It
proposes mandatory entitlement expansions totaling approximately $5.5 billion over the
next 6 years, none of which is offset by increased revenues or reductions in other
outlays. This is a straightforward and substantial breach of last year's budget agreement
- unless there is an emergency. As I have argued at length above, I do not think an
emergency exists - and it is instructive to note that a majority of committee members
apparently did not see the problem to be sufficiently severe to justify raising taxes to
pay for the new spending called for in this legislation.
Perhaps the most important principle agreed upon in last year's budget deal was that
future program expansions should only be made if Congress is willing to pay for them.
The will to raise the necessary taxes for these benefits does not exist in Congress at
this time - hence the attempt to force the President to declare an emergency. If we
are true to the letter and spirit of the Budget Act, we will not enact this legislation.
Id. at H6337 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991).
217. See id. at S11,738-44.
218. See id. at S11,744-45. The Republican Leader submitted for the Congressional Record a
copy of a statement of administration policy released that day opposing the emergency designation.
See id. at S11,746 ("The Administration and most private forecasters believe that the recession is
ending and the recovery is underway.... In this context, the Administration does not believe it is
appropriate to declare an 'emergency' ...
219. See id.
220. Id. at SlI,755.
221. Here are relevant excerpts from the news conference:
Q: Mr. President, what are your plans on the extension of unemployment benefits?
PRESIDENT BUSH: My plans are that I will not sign the Democratic bill. I'm sorry
that they did not adopt - I will probably sign the legislation but I will not declare it
an emergency. I won't bust the budget, bust the caps on the budget that was agreed to
by Democrats and Republicans alike. Senator Dole had a good alternative that would
have done this in a responsible manner. It was beaten back. So I will do what has been
expected, probably sign it and not go for declaring it an emergency.
Q: Don't you agree these benefits are necessary, especially in a place like Maine
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Strictly speaking, a bill that invites use of an exception explicitly provided
by the statute cannot violate the statute. In a less technical response, it should
be noted that this bill was a measured response and not a wholesale suspension
of the deal.2 22 Furthermore, the opponents of the unemployment legislation did
not serve their own strategic interests by arguing that a bill inviting Presidential
designation of an emergency breaks the deal. Their saying that this legislation
would break the deal freed up the advocates of the program to substitute a
method that actually would break the deal: one that would not call on the
President for assent. After all, what worse could the President say than he
already had?
Upon return from the August recess, Democratic congressional leaders began
to try again. On September 17, 1991, Chairman Bentsen introduced S. 1722, the
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991,221 and the Majority Leader
facilitated its being placed on the Senate calendar. 224 As placed on the calendar,
S. 1722 contained the same contingent emergency language as S. 1554 had: it
made Congress's designation of the emergency, invited the President to do the
same, and stated that the law would not take effect unless the President designated
where unemployment is so high?
PRESIDENT BUSH: Yes, I do and that's why I wish they'd gone with the Dole
approach.
Q: The tourist industry is - how do you restore consumer confidence now? Is there
anything you can do? I mean, in Maine the tourist business is the same, the people are
here but they're not spending money. So how do you restore (inaudible)?
PRESIDENT BUSH: You restore it by having sound fiscal policies nationwide, in
the states and in the federal government, and that's the best thing you can do.
Well, as I say, it looks like the national economy is recovering. That's pretty hard
to tell somebody that's out of work. It's pretty hard to say to someone that's out of
work hey, things are getting better - not necessarily getting better for their families.
And when you have difficult economic times, you're faced with difficult economic
choices.
One way to guarantee a less bright future is to have the federal government keep
doing what often in the past it's done, recklessly spend money.
Q: Why don't you veto the unemployment benefits bill? Why take the approach
you're taking? Are you afraid of an override?
PRESIDENT BUSH: That's a possibility but more because we've had a better idea.
It at least demonstrates that I am concerned in terms of economic benefits.
President Bush News Conference With Local Reporters, Aug. 16, 1991; (Reuter Transcripts). See
also Statement on Signing the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, 27 WEEKLY
Comp. PRES. Doc. 1143 (Aug. 26, 1991).
222. As part of a general discussion attesting to compliance with the Budget Enforcement Act,
the Congressional Budget Office contrasted the unemployment proposal with wholesale suspension
of the deal:
Just before recessing in early August, the House and Senate agreed on legislation
temporarily extending unemployment insurance benefits for some recipients in hard-hit
areas. Unlike the wholesale suspension of the act's requirements in the face of slow
economic growth, this legislation was narrowly targeted to address a specific problem
that had arisen in the recession and incipient recovery.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 55 (Aug. 1991).
223. Thirty Senators (mostly Democrats) joined Chairman Bentsen as original cosponsors: Senators
Adams, Dodd, Packwood, Akaka, Ford, Reid, Baucus, Graham, Riegle, Bingaman, Harkin, Rock-
efeller, Bradley, Johnston, Sanford, Breaux, Kennedy, Sasser, Bryan, Lautenberg, Shelby, Burdick,
Leahy, Specter, Cranston, Levin, Wellstone, Daschle, Mitchell, and Wofford.
224. See 137 CONG. REc. S13,198 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (Majority Leader Mitchell asked
unanimous consent that, through the procedures of Senate Standing Rule XIV, the bill go directly
to the calendar); id. at S13,202 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1991) (bill placed on the calendar).
294
Budget Emergencies
the emergency.25 The Republican Leadership agreed to timely consideration, 226
and the Senate began consideration of the bill on September 20, 1991.227
Republican Senators tried to convert the debate into one on tax policy, but
the Senate rejected the Republican amendments. 22 The Senate went on to adopt
a Committee substitute by voice vote229 and pass the bill as amended by a 69 to
30 vote230 - giving its advocates hope that they had enough votes to override
the President's expected veto. That same day, the House passed its version of
the bill by a 294 to 127 vote - once again more than enough votes to override
a veto.?'
A conference committee met and quickly reported an agreement 23 2 that
included language requiring the President to treat the legislation as an emergency
225. As placed on the calendar, section 10 of S. 1722 read:
SEC. 10. EMERGENCY DESIGNATION.
(a) EMERGENCY DESIGNATION. - Pursuant to sections 251(b)(2)(D)(i) and 252(e) of
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, the Congress hereby
designates all direct spending amounts provided by this Act (for all fiscal years) and all
appropriations authorized by this Act (for all fiscal years) as emergency requirements
within the meaning of part C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985.
(b) EFFECTrvENESS. - Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any other
provision of this Act, none of the preceding sections of this Act shall take effect unless,
not later than the date of the enactment of this Act, the President submits to the
Congress a written designation of all direct spending amounts provided by this Act (for
all fiscal years) and all appropriations authorized by this Act (for all fiscal years) as
emergency requirements within the meaning of part C of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
S. 1722, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1991) (as placed on the calendar).
226. See id. at S13,325 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1991) (Majority Leader Mitchell asked unanimous
consent that the Senate turn to the bill on Sept. 20).
227. See id. at S13,374-76, S13,378, S13,380-88, S13,394-98 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1991).
228. On September 24, 1991, the Senate considered and tabled a Dole amendment by a vote of
57 to 42. See id. S13,482-90, S13,537-43, S13,553-60 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1991). For the text of the
Dole amendment, see id. at S13,590-97 (amendment no. 1185). Next the Senate considered a Gramm
amendment designed to cut capital gains taxes and otherwise stimulate economic growth. See id. at
S13,491-524,,S13,535-37, S13,560-61 (amendment no. 1187). For the text of the Gramm amendment,
see id. at S13,597-610. The Majority Leader raised a point of order that the amendment violated the
Origination Clause of the Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 ("All Bills for raising Revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives .... )), the Senate defeated by a 60 to 39 vote
Senator Gramm's motion to table the point of order, and the amendment fell. See 137 CONG. REC.
S13,561 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1991) (Senate Vote 202). The Senate also considered a McCain amendment
amending the budget process to impede tax increases and facilitate tax cuts. See id. at S13,530-34,
S13,561-62 (amendment no. 1190). For the text of the McCain amendment, see id. at S13,612. The
Majority Leader raised a point of order that the amendment violated a Congressional Budget Act
limitation on budget process changes (Congressional Budget Act § 306, 2 U.S.C. § 637 (Supp. II
1990)), the Senate defeated by a 62 to 37 vote a McCain motion to waive the limitation, and the
amendment fell. See 137 CoNG. REC. at S13,530-34, S13,561-62 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1991) (Senate
Vote 204). Waiving section 306 of the Congressional Budget Act requires the affirmative vote of 60
Senators. See Congressional Budget Act § 904(c).
229. See 137 CONG. REC. S13,525-34, S13,553-62 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1991) (amendment no. 1188,
as modified).
230. See id. at S13,571 (Senate Vote 205).
231. See id. at H6869-70 (House Vote 280).
232. The House was considered to have adopted a motion to insist on the House amendment
and to request a conference with the Senate pursuant to the rule. See id. at H6870 (daily ed. Sept.
25, 1991). The House named Representatives Rostenkowski, Downey, Ford of Tennessee, Kennelly,
Andrews of Texas, Archer, Vander Jagt, and Shaw as conferees. See id. The next day, the Senate
disagreed to the House amendments and agreed to a conference by unanimous consent, and named
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upon signature. 233 To remove any room for doubt, the language then directed
the President not to count the costs of the legislation.
23 4
In the Senate, the Ranking Republican Member of the Budget Committee
attacked the new language as a rewriting of the budget law, 235 and thus violative
of the Congressional Budget Act's limitations on budget process law. 23 6 Budget
Committee Chairman Sasser moved to waive the limitation, arguing that the
unemployment legislation merely applied the emergency exception as the partici-
pants in the summit had foreseen it would be applied. 23 7 The difference in
language proved enough to change the votes of enough moderate Republican
Senators. 238 The Senate voted 65 to 34 to waive the Budget Act restriction, 2 9 and
then went on to approve the conference report by a vote of 65 to 35.M24 The
House expiditiously approved the conference report the same day.2
Senators Bentsen, Mitchell, Riegle, Packwood, and Dole as conferees. See id. at S13,766 (daily ed.
Sept. 26, 1991). One day later, on September 27, the conference committee filed a conference report
(S. CONF. REP. No. 162, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991)) in the Senate. See 137 CoNG. REc. S13,882-
89 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1991).
233. The conference report accompanying S. 1722 included the following budgetary provisions:
TITLE IV - BUDGET PROVISIONS
SEC. 401. TREATMENT UNDER PAY-AS-You-Go PROCEDURES.
(a) DESIGNATION As EMERGENCY. - The provisions of (and amendments made by)
this Act shall be treated as provisions designated as emergency requirements by the
President and the Congress under section 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985.
(b) NEw BUDGET AUTHORITY, ETC., NOT CONSIDERED. - Any amount of new budget
authority or outlays resulting from the provisions of (and amendments made by) this
Act shall not be considered for any purpose under the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985.
SEC. 402. EXEMPTION OF EMERGENCY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION FROM SEQUESTRA-
TION.
Payments under title I of this Act (relating to emergency unemployment compensation)
shall be exempt from any order issued under part C of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
S. CONF. REP. No. 162, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1991) (the entire title appears in italics in the
original); 137 CONG. REc. S13,886 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1991).
234. See id.
235. See 137 CONG. REc. S13,890-91, S13,893 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1991); id. at S14,001-09 (daily
ed. Oct. 1, 1991).
236. Congressional Budget Act § 306, 2 U.S.C. § 637 (Supp. 11 1990).
237. See 137 CONG. REC. S13,891-94 (daly ed. Sept. 27, 1991); id. at S14,002-03, S14,009 (daily
ed. Oct. 1, 1991).
238. See, e.g., id. at S13,913-14 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
239. See id. at S14,009 (Senate vote 212).
240. See id. at S14,010 (Senate vote 213).
241. The House Committee on Rules held a hearing before the conference committee submitted
its report and reported out a rule (H. Res. 230) that (among other things) waived all points of order
against the conference report. See id. at H6939, D1164 (Sept. 26, 1991). On October 1, the date of
Senate action, the conference committee filed its report with the House (see id. at H7111-18 (daily
ed. Oct.l 1991)), the House adopted the rule on the conference report by a 270 to 147 vote (see id.
at H7127-37 (House vote 284)), and the House passed the conference report by a 300 to 118 vote.
See id. at H7137-44 (House vote 285).
For additional speeches on the bill after its passage, see id. at H7118 (daily ed. Oct. 101, 1991)
(statement of Rep. Ireland in opposition); id. at H7118-19 (statement of Rep. Wise of W. Va. in
support); id. at H7119 (statements of Rep. Glickman and Mazzoli in support); id. at S13,992
(statement of Sen. Kennedy in support); id. at S14,010-11 (statement of Senate Republican Leader
Dole in opposition); id. at S14,123-24 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1991) (statements of Sens. Dole & Hatch in
opposition); id. at E3272 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1991) (statement of Rep. Poshard in support); id. at
S14,400 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1991) (statement of Sen. Exon in support); id. at H7553-54 (daily ed. Oct.
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The President vetoed the bill, once again charging a "breach[ of] the budget
agreement. "242 The Senate received his message on October 15. 4 After two hours
of debate the next day, the Senate fell two votes short of overriding the President's
veto. 244
On November 1, 1991, Ways and Means Committee Chairman Rostenkowski
and Congressman Downey introduced a bill, H.R. 3697, that sought to pay for
the increased spending with increased taxes. 4 5 It did not include emergency
designation, but explicitly exempted both the bill's spending and its receipts from
the budget calculations.3
On November 7, the Senate Democratic Leadership introduced another
version that would have given the President the choice whether (1) to declare the
spending an emergency, (2) to pay for the spending with cuts in international
aid, or (3) to pay for the spending with new taxes. 247 This choice would have
presented the President with another hybrid of the contingent emergency. 24
8, 1991) (statement of House Republican Leader Michel in opposition); id. at H7818 (daily ed. Oct.
15, 1991) (statement of Rep. Obey in support); id. at H7822 (statement of Rep. Applegate in support);
id. at H7851-60 (statements of Reps. Wise of W. Va., Smith of Fla. & Fazio in support); id. at
H7860 (statement of Rep. Slaughter in support); id. at H7866 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1991) (statement
of Rep. DeLauro in support); id. at H7983 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep. Dorgan in
support); id. at H7985 (statement of Rep. Durbin in support); id. at E3427-28 (statement of Rep.
Murtha in support); id. at E3431-33 (statement of Rep. Bustamante); id. at E3436 (statement of Rep.
AuCoin in support); id. at S14,877-79 (statement of Sen. Riegle in support).
242. President's, Veto of S. 1722: Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. D34.
243. See 137 CONG. REC. S14,619 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991).
244. See id. at S14,736-57 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1991) (Senate vote 221).
245. See id. at E3666 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1991). The bill was referred to the Committee on Energy
and Commerce and the Committee on Ways and Means. See id. at H9043.
246. Section 701 of the bill provides:
SEC. 701. TREATMENT UNDER PAY-AS-YOU-GO PROCEDURES.
Any amount of new budget authority, outlays, or receipts resulting from the provisions
of (and amendments made by) this Act shall not be considered for any purpose under
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
H.R. 3697, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 701 (1991).
247. See S. 1945, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S16,318-24 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991).
The Leadership moved the bill to the calendar, where it languished. See 137 CONG. REC. S16,332,
S16,449 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1991). The Republican Leadership prepared amendments. See id. at
S16,625-26 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1991) (Dole amendments no. 1320-1332); id. at S16,631-40 (Kasten
amendment no. 1336). After the President signed unemployment legislation, the Senate indefinitely
postponed the bill by unanimous consent. See id. at S17,089 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991).
248. Sections 401, 411, and 421 of the bill posed the choice:
TITLE IV - BUDGETARY PROVISIONS
SUBTITLE A - EMERGENCY TREATMENT
SEC. 401. EFFEcTlvEzss.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any other provision of this Act, section
402 of this Act shall take effect only if, on or before the date of the enactment of this
Act -
(1) the President has not submitted to the Congress either of the written declarations
described in sections 411 and 421, or
(2) the President has submitted to the Congress both of such declarations.
SEC. 402. EMERGENCY DESIGNATION.
All direct spending amounts provided by the provisions of (and amendments made
by) this Act (for all fiscal years) and all appropriations authorized by the provisions of
(and amendments made by) this Act (for all fiscal years, whenever appropriated) shall
be treated as provisions designated as emergency requirements (for all fiscal years,
whenever appropriated or otherwise enacted) by the President and the Congress under
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Administration officials and Congressional Leaders agreed to a compromise
bilP 9 that ostensibly paid for the new spending with new taxes and the President
signed the bill into law on November 15 .210 The new law did not include any
emergency designation. The Congressional Budget Office and the Office of
Management and Budget differed over whether the bill actually paid for itself.
251
One Senior Republican staffer dubious of Office of Management and Budget
scorekeeping neutrality is quoted as having said: "We declared an emergency for
$1.7 billion - without actually saying so.
''252
5. Natural Disaster Relief Supplemental Appropriations Bill
The fifth major emergency bill passed by Congress and the fourth enacted,
the Natural Disaster Relief Supplemental, 253 began on October 10, 1991 as H.R.
3543. 2-4 As reported to the House on October 17,2 5 H.R. 3543 funded a number
of domestic programs as well as defense programs. H.R. 3543 nonetheless included
section 251(b)(2)(D)(i) or section 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985.
SUBTITLE B - REDUCTIONS IN FOREIGN AID AND OTHER SPENDING
SEC. 411. EFFECTIVENESS.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any other provision of this Act, all
of the provisions of this subtitle shall take effect only if -
(1) not later than the date of the enactment of this Act, the President submits to the
Congress a written declaration of the need for reductions in foreign aid and other
spending, under this subtitle; and
(2) the President has not submitted on or before such date the written declaration
described in section 421.
SUBTITLE C - ALTERNATIVE FINANCING PROVISIONS
SEC. 421. EraCTIVNESS.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any other provision of this Act, all
of the provisions of this subtitle [regarding the unemployment surtax and the individual
estimated tax requirement] and the provisions of parts II and III of subtitle B [regarding
the collection of nontax debts and guaranteed student loans] shall take effect only if
(1) not later than the date of the enactment of this Act, the President submits to the
Congress a written declaration of the need for the financing provisions under this
subtitle, and
(2) the President has not submitted on or before such date the written declaration
described in section 411.
S. 1945, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 401, 411 & 421, 137 CONG. REC. S16,318-24 (daily ed. Nov. 7,
1991).
249. H.R. 3575, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
250. Pub. L. No. 102-164 (1991). A second bill adjusted the formula somewhat. See Pub. L. No.
102-183 (1991) (H.R. 1724, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)).
251. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the bill would increase the deficit by $1.225
million and that a related bill would add $522 million, for a total of $1.747 billion in damage to the
deficit. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 1993-
1997 99 (Jan. 1992).
252. George Hager, Huge Deficit Adds Pressure for Spending Rules Changes, 49 CoNG. Q. 3728,
3729 (1991).
253. Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers for Relief From the Effects of
Natural Disasters, for Other Urgent Needs, and for Incremental Cost of 'Operation Desert Shield/
Desert Storm' Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-229, 105 Stat. 1701 (Dec. 12, 1991) (H.J. Res. 157,
102d Cong, 1st Sess. (1991)).
254. H.R. 3543 was referred to the House Appropriations Committee on October 10, 1991. 137
CoNo. REc. H7800 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1991).
255. See id. at H8100-01 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991); H.R. REP. No. 255, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
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a blanket emergency designation that argued for like treatment of domestic and
defense emergencies. 2 6 Representative Schroeder argued for a yet wider applica-
tion of the emergency designation to allow appropriations to fund WIC, Head
Start, immunization programs, and other children's programs.2"7 The House
adopted Representative Schroeder's amendment - which would have added
emergency funding of $1.39 billion in fiscal year 1992 alone - by a vote of 243
to 180.218 With other amendments, the House passed H.R. 3543 by a 252 to 162
vote. 259 In the Senate, the Presiding Officer referred the bill to the Appropriations
Committee under the rules, and it went no further.
26
0
To move the substance of the disaster relief supplemental, on November 15,
the Senate took up and reported 26 ' another vehicle, H.J. Res 157, a joint resolution
that House Appropriations Committee Chairman Whitten had introduced on
February 28 to make technical corrections and correcting enrollment errors in
fiscal year 1991 appropriations acts. 262 The Appropriations Committee reported
H.J. Res. 157 to the Senate with proposed amendments that would have granted
greater discretion to the President in his designation of emergencies. Among its
general provisions, the Committee amendment included language like that in
H.R. 3543 in which Congress designated all appropriations in the bill as emergency
requirements. 263 The Committee amendment went further, however, and stated
256. Section 201 read:
SEc. 201. CONGRESSIONAL DESIGNATION OF EMERGENCY. - Although the President
has only designated portions of the funds in this bill pertaining to the incremental costs
of Desert Shield/Desert Storm and certain Federal Emergency Management Agency
costs as "emergency requirements", the Congress believes that the same or higher
priority should be given to helping American people recover from natural disasters and
other emergency situations as has been given to foreign aid "emergency" needs. The
Congress therefore designates all funds in this Act as "emergency requirements" for all
purposes of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
H.R. 3543, 102d Cong, 1st Sess. § 201 (1991).
257. See 137 CONG. REC. H8472 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1991) (statement of Rep. Schroeder); id. at
H8615-25 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (debate on Schroeder amendment); id. at H8582 (statement of
Rep. Schroeder).
258. See id. at H8625 (House vote 347).
259. - See id. at H8647 (House vote 352).
260. See id. at S15,696 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1991) (referral). For additional speeches on H.R. 3543
after House passage, see id. at H8583 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (statement of Rep. Sarpalius); id. at
E3624 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1991) (statement of Rep. DeLauro); id. at E3626 (statement of Rep. Penny)
id. at E3667 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1991) (statement of Rep. Lehman of Cal.); id. at E3711-12 (daily ed.
Nov. 5, 1991) (statement of Rep. Chandler of Wash.); id. at E3893 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991)
(statement of Rep. Dixon of Cal.); id. at H10,846-47 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Barrett).
261. See id. at S16,847; D1438 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1991) (S. Rep. No. 216, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991)).
262. H.J. Res 157, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The House passed H.J. Res 157 on February
28 by voice vote. 137 CONG. REc. H1294-95 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1991). In the Senate later that day,
the Presiding Officer referred it to the Appropriations Committee. See id. at 52506. Appropriations
Committee Chairman Byrd asked unanimous consent to take up and pass the joint resolution, but
objection was heard. See id. at S2500-02. Congress then included the substance of H.J. Res. 157 in
Title IV of H.R. 1281, the Dire Emergency Supplemental, which the Senate began considering on
March 19. See id. at S3491 (daily ed. March 1, 1991). (For discussion of H.R. 1281, see supra notes
161-188 and accompanying text.) Thus, after enactment of H.R. 1281, H.J. Res. 157 remained in
the Senate Appropriations Committee as an apparently useless vehicle.
263. Section 200 of the Committee amendment read:
SEC. 200. CONGRESSIONAL DESIGNATION OF EMERGENCY. - Although the President
has only designated portions of the funds in this joint resolution pertaining to the
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that no funds in the joint resolution would be available for obligation unless
they either constituted Desert Shield emergency costs or were designated by the
President to be emergency requirements. 2" This item-by-item contingency emer-
gency language would have given the President the functional equivalent of an
absolute line-item veto over the appropriations in the joint resolution. The
President could have exercised that veto to reduce or eliminate any funding levels
in the joint resolution. Further, Congress could not have overridden the choices
the joint resolution would have thus delegated to the President to make. After
a cloture threat, 265 the Senate moved to and debated H.J. Res. 157 on November
22,26 passing the joint resolution with emergency language similar to what the
Committee had recommended .67
As the end of the Session neared, the conference committee met quickly 68
and reported to the House269 an agreement that addressed emergencies in a
number of places. The conference committee reverted to a general provision like
that in the House vehicle. 270 The conference agreement language designated all
items in the first two titles of the joint resolution as emergency requirements, in
incremental costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm and certain Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency costs as "emergency requirements", the Congress believes that the
same or higher priority should be given to helping American people recover from natural
disasters and other emergency situations as has been given to foreign aid "emergency"
needs. The Congress therefore designates all funds in this joint resolution as "emergency
requirements" for all purposes of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985. '
H.J. Res 157, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 200 (1991) (Committee amendment as reported to the Senate).
264. Section 202 of the Committee amendment read:
SEC. 202. Notwithstanding any other provision of this joint resolution, funds in this
joint resolution are available for obligation only for costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm
or to the extent and only in the amount designated by the President, not later than the
date of enactment of this joint resolution, to be emergency funding requirements within
the meaning of part C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985, as amended.
Id. § 202.
265. See 137 CoNo. REc. S17,284 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1991) (cloture filed); id. at S17,390 (daily
ed. Nov. 21, 1991) (cloture vote vitiated).
266. See id. at S17,540-617, S17,620-35 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1991).
267. See id. S17,634 (resolution passed by 75 to 17 vote, Senate vote 270).
The Senate-passed provision added the language italicized in the following to the Committee
amendment:
SEC. 202. Notwithstanding any other provision of this joint resolution, funds in this
joint resolution, other than those made available by transfer, are available for obligation
only to the extent and only in the amount designated by the President, not later than
the date of enactment of this joint resolution, to be emergency funding requirements
within the meaning of part C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985, as amended.
H.J. Res 157, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1991) (as passed by the Senate).
268. See 137 CoNo. REC. D1518 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991); id. at D1529 (daily ed. Nov. 26,
1991).
After agreeing to a conference with the Senate, the House instructed (on a voice vote) its
conferees to choose a clean emergency package that the President would be likely to sign over a
product containing extraneous and nonemergency items that the President would be likely to veto.
See id. at H11,119-21 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (McDade motion).
269. See id. at H11,458-69; D1526; H.R. CONF. REP. 394, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
270. Compare H.J. Res 157, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1991) (as recommended by the conference
committee); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 394, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1991) with H.R. 3543, 102d
Cong, 1st Sess. § 201 (1991).
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effect inviting the President to choose whether to designate them or not,2 7' but
it did not include the sweeping item-by-item contingent emergency language in
the Senate-passed joint resolution. In three provisions, however, the conference
agreement did delegate to the President power to fund particular expenditures to
whatever dollar level the President chooses. One section of the conference
agreement granted the President authority to transfer up to $100 million from
the defense category to transport international assistance to the Soviet Union (or
parts of it), upon the President's designation of an emergency under the budget
law.2 72 The provisions funding the Federal Emergency Management Agency and
the Commodity Credit Corporation (both of which fall under the general con-
gressional emergency designation) provide funding (of up to $143 million for the
former and $755 million for the latter) contingent on the President's submitting
formal budget requests that include emergency designations.2 73 The provision on
271. See H.J. Res 157, § 202; 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), H.R. CONT. REP. No. 394, at 13-
14.
272. Section 109 of the joint resolution provides:
SEC. 109. In addition to other transfer authority available to the Department of
Defense, the Secretary of Defense, upon the declaration of an emergency by the President
under the terms of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
as amended, may transfer from amounts appropriated to the Department of Defense
for fiscal year 1992 or from balances in working capital accounts established under
section 2208 of title 10, United States Code, not to exceed $100,000,000, to the
appropriate accounts within the Department of Defense, in order to transport by military
or commercial means, food, medical supplies, and other types of humanitarian assistance
to the Soviet Union, or its Republics, or localities therein - with the consent of the
relevant Republic government or its independent successor - in order to address
emergency conditions which may arise therein, and for the purposes set forth in section
301 of H.R. 3807, as passed the Senate on November 25, 1991, and under the terms
and conditions of such section 301 of H.R. 3807: Provided, That the readiness of the
United States Armed Forces shall not be diminished by such transfer of funds: Provided
further,. That the Committees on Appropriations be notified of transfers under this
provision fifteen days in advance.
H.J. Res 157, § 202; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 394, at 9 (the original prints the entire section in italics).
273. Under the headings "FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY," "DISASTER RELIEF," and
"(INCLUDING TRANSFER OF FUNDS)," the conference report provides:
For emergency disaster assistance payments necessary to provide for expenses in
presidentially-declared disasters under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emer-
gency Assistance Act, an additional amount for "Disaster relief", $943,000,000, to
remain available until expended, of which $143,000,000 shall be available only after
submission to the Congress of a formal budget request by the President designating the
$143,000,000 as an emergency: . . . Provided further, That hereafter, beginning in fiscal
year 1993, and in each year thereafter, notwithstanding any other provision of law, all
amounts appropriated for disaster assistance payments under the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) that are in excess
of either the historical annual average obligation of $320,000,000, or the amount
submitted in the President's initial budget request, whichever is lower, shall be considered
as "emergency requirements" pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(D) of the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, and such amounts shall hereafter be so
designated.
H.J. Res 157; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 394, at 9 (the original prints the entire section in italics).
Under the headings "CHAPTER 1I," "DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE," and "COM-
MODITY CREDIT CORPORATION," the conference report provides:
In view of the occurrence of recent natural disasters - similar to the volcano eruption
of 1980, the earthquake of 1989, and the hurricane of 1989 - droughts, floods, freezes,
tornadoes, and other catastrophes which resulted in billions of dollars in damages, and
in an effort to restore the economy and to alleviate the effects of the disasters, an
additional $1,750,000,000, to remain available until expended, is hereby made available
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the Federal Emergency Management Agency also directs that (beginning in fiscal
year 1993) all amounts appropriated under the Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act above either a historical average or the President's
budget request shall be considered emergency requirements, regardless of Presi-
dential designation.2 74 The House passed the conference agreement by a 303 to
114 vote, 271 the Senate passed it by a voice vote, 276 and the President signed it
into law December 12.277
After designations by the President, the Natural Disaster Relief Supplemental
enacted $10.4 billion in budget authority and $6.8 billion in emergency require-
ments in the defense category and $1.9 billion in budget authority and $1.4
billion in outlays in the domestic category.278
6. Anticipated Desert Shield Costs
Desert Shield exceptions already enacted may have greater effects than at
first anticipated, notwithstanding their emergency status. The Congressional Budget
Office projects that more Desert Storm spending will take place in fiscal years
1992 and 1993 than the Office of Management and Budget projected.2 79 Conse-
quently, if the Office of Management and Budget closely adheres to the law,
participants in the budget process will find it more difficult to stay within the
1993 limits than they had thought due to the out-year effects of fiscal year 1991
emergency spending.
2 0
Additional Desert Shield legislation is in the pipeline. In late July 1991, the
Senate debated the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992
and 1993, giving notice of further issues as to whether items constituted emergency
Desert Shield costs or not. The Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee
for losses associated with 1990 crops as authorized by Public Law 101-624, and for
losses associated with 1991 and 1992 crops under the same terms and conditions:
Provided, That $995,000,000 of this amount is available for payments to producers for
losses on either 1990 or 1991 crops, at the producer's option: Provided further, That
the remaining $755,000,000 shall be available only to the extent an official budget
request, for a specific dollar amount, that includes designation of the entire amount of
the request as an emergency requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, is transmitted to the Congress: ....
Id.; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 394, at 12.
274. See id.; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 394, at 9.
275. See 137 CoNG. REc. H11,483 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (House vote 438). For House debate
on the conference agreement, see id. at H11,477-82.
276. See id. at S18,570 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991). For Senate debate on the conference agreement,
see id. at S18,569-70, S18,664.
277. See Pub. L. No. 102-229, 105 Stat. 1701 (1991).
278. See Congressional Budget Office, FY 1991/1992 Discretionary Appropriations Designated by
the President and the Congress as Emergency Requirements 2, 4 (Jan. 17, 1992).
279. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 222, at 57-59.
280. Id. at 58-59. The Congressional Budget Office report states:
Policymakers ... may find the 1993 caps to be a bit tighter than they now
anticipate .... [M]ore Desert Storm-related defense outlays than originally thought will
probably spill into 1993. Although appropriations for Desert Storm were an emergency
and thus entailed a revision to the caps, this revision took place just once. [The Office
of Management and Budget] is not free to update estimates of emergency legislation
for technical reasons (such as slower-than-expected spending). Thus, unless [the Office
of Management and Budget] turns a blind eye to this spending when gauging compliance
with the 1993 caps, other defense outlays will be cramped.
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criticized the liberal use of designations of incremental costs of Desert Shield in
that bill.2"' Similarly, a Boren amendment offered to the authorization bill on
281. During debate on the Defense Authorization Bill, Senator Sasser said:
When we get beneath the surface of this bill, this bill would actually push defense
spending over the caps agreed to in the budget summit agreement and enacted into law
if the Appropriations Committee would follow the spending plan that is outlined in this
authorization bill.
The problem occurs as a result of several line items which the bill just arbitrarily
declares to be off budget. Using a term of art established last year for the cost of the
Iraqi war, and that term of art is called incremental cost of Desert Storm. It has a
very explicit definition. It means those defense costs that are a direct consequence of
the war effort over and above programs already planned that would normally have
been requested by the Pentagon had there not been a war effort.
One simple way to determine that a program is not caused by the war is if it appears
in the President's 1992 budget request either for fiscal year 1992 or subsequent years.
If it appears there, if it is requested by the administration in any case, then it surely is
not an incremental cost of Desert Shield or Desert Storm because the administration
was planning on spending that money whether or not there was a war. So it cannot
fall into the category of an incremental cost of Desert Storm.
Another test is whether or not it is the administration's estimate of direct cost of
Desert Storm. If it is not, and we choose to add it, we are inevitably going to exceed
the administration's estimate of total cost for the war which the administration now
says is some $61 billion.
Of course, it is very easy to construct some rationale whereby any expenditure is
somehow declared to be war related. That is not the issue. An expenditure must be
directly caused by the war effort. That is the definition of an incremental cost of Desert
Storm or Desert Shield.
The bill that we are debating today declares some $1.3 billion to be incremental cost
of Desert Storm, none of which was requested by the President under the heading of
incremental cost of Desert Shield and most of which appears in the President's Pentagon
budget request for fiscal year 1992 or beyond. It was there whether there was going to
be a war or not.
Mr. President, we simply cannot get into an arbitrary designation of what is war
costs. It opens the door to absolutely massive amounts of military spending that we
cannot afford.
This bill designates $652 million in "incremental cost of Desert Shield" spending for
two JSTARS aircraft, $326 million apiece for an airplane. And the justification in this
report is as follows:
The committee believes that an ongoing JSTARS presence in Southwest Asia
- like AWACS - is a stabilizing presence and is likely to be a permanent
feature of the U.S. military presence in the region.
The committee continues:
As such, the committee believes it is thoroughly appropriate to buy two
additional JSTARS aircraft with residual cooperation account funds.
Mr. President, a prominent presence in Southwest Asia, that is not a rationale for
buying two new airplanes that cost over $550 million, charging the taxpayers and saying,
oh, well, that is an incremental cost of Desert Storm.
Under the same logic, why do we not go out and buy five or six new aircraft carriers.
We could find plenty of places to put those, I suppose, and charge those off to war
efforts. The possibilities here are virtually endless.
Yes, the existing JSTAR aircraft, when they participated in the gulf effort, were not
shot down. They were not even fired on. So do they need replacing?
We simply cannot allow a simple definition of what is "incremental costs of Desert
Shield."
But to be perfectly clear, Mr. President, I put these questions to the Congressional
Budget Office last night and received the following answer this morning. . ..
... [T]he designation of "incremental costs of Desert Shield" does not appropriately
apply, according to CBO, to either the $652 million for two JSTAR aircraft, the roughly
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November 25 used contingent emergency language similar to that in the Senate-
reported Disaster Relief Supplemental to shield funding to transport aid to the
Soviet Union from points of order.
22
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
While the Constitution's first Presentment Clause23 sets forth a procedure
for the Congress to present bills to the President for approval or veto in their
totality, the process of designating or not designating emergencies creates another,
intermediate option for the President, a middle ground between signing and
vetoing. As President Bush did with the unemployment insurance bill, the
President may sign the bill but not designate the emergency. Cases, like the
unemployment insurance bill, that make effectiveness of the bill contingent on
the President's designation of the bill's spending as emergency requirements
highlight the relationship of this intermediate option to the normal constitutional
process. In such cases, the President gets the effect of an absolute veto over the
bill by not declaring an emergency. How does this middle ground relate to the
Presentment Clauses?
In Wright v. United States,281 the Supreme Court explained the purposes
behind the Presentment Clauses:
The constitutional provisions have two fundamental purposes; (1) that the Pres-
ident shall have suitable opportunity to consider the bills presented to him, and
(2) that the Congress shall have suitable opportunity to consider his objections
to bills and on such consideration to pass them over his veto provided there are
the requisite votes. Edwards v. United States, 286 U. S. 482, 486. We should
not adopt a construction which would frustrate either of these purposes. 285
$200 million for heavy equipment transporter tactical trailers, and an additional $10
million weapons and combat vehicles production base support.
We should not put the items I have discussed here today into the Desert Storm
supplemental and assume they will be funded from the defense cooperation account.
CBO is not going to score these expenditures as "incremental costs of Desert Shield."
They will, therefore, count against the defense. cap.
137 CONG. REc. S11,438-39 (daily ed. July 31, 1991).
282. See id. at S18,047 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (amendment number 1441).
283. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
284. 302 U.S. 583 (1938). The Court in Wright held that where the Congress has not adjourned
and the House in which a bill originated is in recess for not more than 3 days while Congress is in
session, the bill does not become a law if the President has delivered the bill with his objections to
the appropriate officer of that House within the prescribed 10 days and the Congress does not pass
the bill over his objections by the requisite votes. Id. at 598.
285. Id. at 596. Similarly, in Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932), the Court said:
The last sentence of [the first Presentment Clause] clearly indicates two definite and
controlling purposes: First. To insure promptness and safeguard the opportunity of the
Congress for reconsideration of bills which the President disapproves; hence the fixing
of a time limit so that the status of measures shall not be held indefinitely in abeyance
through inaction on the part of the President. Second. To safeguard the opportunity
of the President to consider all bills presented to him, so that it may not be destroyed
by the adjournment of the Congress during the time allowed to the President for that
purpose.
Id. at 486. Later, the Court reiterated: "Regard must be had to the fundamental purpose of the
constitutional provision to provide appropriate opportunity for the President to consider the bills
presented to him." Id. at 493.
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The Court thus divides analysis of the Presentment Clause into its two
purposes. In The Pocket Veto Case,28 6 the Court highlighted the importance of
Constitution's plan to give the President's an adequate opportunity to consider
bills:
The Constitution in giving the President a qualified negative over legislation -
commonly called a veto - entrusts him with an authority and imposes upon
him an obligation that are of the highest importance, in the execution of which
it is made his duty not only to sign bills that he approves in order that they may
become law, but to return bills that he disapproves, with his objections, in order
that they may be reconsidered by Congress. The faithful and effective exercise
of this momentous duty necessarily requires time in which the President may
carefully examine and consider a bill and determine, after due deliberation,
whether he should approve or disapprove it, and if he disapproves it, formulate
his objections for the consideration of Congress. To that end a specified time is
given, after the bill has been presented to him, in which he may examine its
provisions and either approve it or return it, not approved, for reconsidera-
tion.... The power thus conferred upon the President cannot be narrowed or
cut down by Congress, nor the time within which it is to be exercised lessened,
directly or indirectly. And it is just as essential a part of the constitutional
provisions, guarding against ill-considered and unwise legislation, that the Pres-
ident, on his part should have the full time allowed him for determining whether
he should approve or disapprove a bill, and if disapproved, for adequately
formulating the objections that should be considered by Congress, as it is that
Congress, on its part, should have an opportunity to re-pass the bill over his
objections."'
The emergency procedures require the President to make a decision as to
designation no later than five days after enactment of a piece of legislation.2 s8
The unemployment insurance legislation called on the President to make that
decision no later than the date of enactment.2 9 Under these limitations, the
President does "have suitable opportunity to consider the bills presented to
him.' '29 As the emergency scheme does not require the President to make any
decision before enactment, it adds no burdens more onerous than the constitu-
tional scheme laid out in the Presentment Clauses. To the President, the emergency
procedure is equivalent to a decision whether to approve or disapprove a complex
statute, or whether to approve or disapprove two related statutes, where one of
the two legislates contingent on the enactment of the other. This burden does
not violate the Constitution's requirements under the Presentment Clause.
Not so clear a case would exist if a statute somehow required the President
to make a decision before the date of enactment. In such a case, the President
286. 279 U.S. 655 (1929). The Pocket Veto Case Court held that the adjournment of the first
session of a Congress can prevent the President from returning a bill within 10 days, and thus a bill
passed within 10 days of such an adjournment that is not signed by the President does not become
law. 279 U.S. at 691-92.
287. Id. at 677-78 (footnotes omitted). The Court further extolled the "imperative" significance
of the President's role under the Presentment Clauses in Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-48.
288. See supra note 95 and accompanying text,
289. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
290. Wright, 302 U.S. at 596.
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might well argue that the Congress sought to cut down the ten day opportunity
for consideration that the Presentment Clause grants the President.
The emergency procedure has more dramatic consequences for Congress's
powers under the Presentment Clause. As the President may sign the bill including
such an emergency provision but not designate an emergency, the emergency
procedure deprives the Congress of its opportunity to enact that particular bill
into law notwithstanding the President's objections. With regard to the Congress's
opportunity, the Court in Wright stated:
Where the President does not approve a bill, the plan of the Constitution is
to give to the Congress the opportunity to consider his objections and to pass
the bill despite his disapproval. It is for this purpose that the time limit for
return is fixed. This opportunity is as important as that of the President."
The Federal Convention of 1787 that drafted the Constitution considered
early and resoundingly rejected a proposal to grant the President "an absolute
negative," that is, a veto without the possibility of override.292 On June 4, 1787,
James Wilson of Pennsylvania, seconded by Alexander Hamilton, moved to strike
the provision for overriding the President's veto. 293 Elbridge Gerry of Massachu-
setts "saw no necessity for so great a [control] over the legislature[,] as the best
men in the Community would be comprised in the two branches of it.
'
"294
Benjamin Franklin rejected the proposal as tending toward the corruption of the
executive, recounting how the Pennsylvania Governor had extorted personal gain
in exchange for withholding his veto. 295 Roger Sherman of Connecticut opposed
291. Id.
292. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY
JAMES MADISON 61-66 (A. Koch ed. 1987) (1840); H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, 746, 753 (C.
Tansill ed. 1927) (reprinting, ROBERT YATES, NOTES OF THE SECRET DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, TAKEN BY THE LATE HONI.] ROBERT YATES, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, AND ONE OF THE DELEGATES FROM THAT STATE TO THE SAID CONVENTION (Washington,
1836)) [hereinat'ter YATES]; id. at 847-48 (reprinting 1 THE LiFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING
587-619 (New York 1896) ("Notes of Rufus King in the Federal Convention of 1787")) [hereinafter
KING].
293. See KING, supra note 292, at 847 (reporting the motion by Wilson seconded by Hamilton).
Cf. MADISON, supra note 292, at 61 (reporting the motion by Wilson and Hamilton); YATES, supra
note 292 (reporting the motion but not the mover).
294. MADIsoN, supra note 292, at 62.
295. See MADISON, supra note 292, at 62; KING, supra note 292, at 84748. James Madison's
notes recount Franklin's speech:
[DOCTOR] FRANKLIN, said he was sorry to differ from his colleague for whom he had
a very great respect, on any occasion, but he could not help it on this. He had had
some experience of this check in the Executive on the Legislature, under the proprietary
Government of [Pennsylvania]. The negative of the Governor was constantly made use
of to extort money. No good law whatever could be passed without a private bargain
with him. An increase of his salary, or some donation, was always made a condition;
till at last it became the regular practice, to have orders in his favor on the Treasury,
presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might actually receive the former
before he should sign the latter. When the Indians were scalping the western people,
and notice of it arrived, the concurrence of the Governor in the means of self-[defense]
could not be got, till it was agreed that his Estate should be exempted from taxation:
so that the people were to fight for the security of his property, whilst he was to bear
no share of the burden. This was a mischievous sort of check. If the Executive was to
have a Council, such a power would be less objectionable. It was true, the King of
[Great Britain] had not, as was said, exerted his negative since the Revolution; but that
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the proposal, as he thought it unlikely that any single person would so outshine
the Congress in wisdom.219 James Madison thought the absolute negative unnec-
essary, as it would grant little power that a veto subject to override would not,
as the President would likely be unable to resist the Congress unless he had some
congressional support. 297 Pierce Butler of South Carolina warned of the specter
of constantly increasing executive power. 29 Gunning Bedford, Jr., of Delaware
matter was easily explained. The bribes and emoluments now given to the .members of
parliament rendered it unnecessary, every thing being done according to the will of the
Ministers. [Franklin] was afraid, if a negative should be given as proposed, that more
power and money would be demanded, till at last [enough] would be gotten to influence
[and] bribe the Legislature into [complete] subjection to the will of the Executive.
MADISON, supra note 292, at 62.
Rufus King's notes state:
Franklin opposed - Our former [Governor] in [Pennsylvania] abused this power of
a full Negative and extorted money from the Legislature, before he would sign their
acts - in one instance he refused his Signature to a Bill to march the Militia [against]
the Indians, till the Bill exempted from Taxes the Estate of the Proprietors on account
of the expense of the Militia.
One man cannot be believed to possess more wisdom than both Branches of the
Legislature - the Royal Negative has not been exercised since the Revolution; he easily
does by corruption what could be done with some risk by his negative.
KING, supra note 292, at 847-48.
Robert Yates's notes summarize: "Dr. Franklin [was] against the motion - The power [would
be] dangerous, and would be abused so as to get money for passing bills." R. YATES, supra note
292.
296. See MADISON, supra note 292, at 62-63. Madison's notes record Sherman's statement:
Mr. SIEImAN was [against] enabling any one man to stop the will of the whole. No
one man could be found so far above all the rest in wisdom. He thought we ought to
avail ourselves of his wisdom in revising the laws, but not permit him to [overrule] the
decided and cool opinions of the Legislature.
Id. Note that King's notes appear to attribute these thoughts to Franklin. See supra note 295.
297. See MADISON, supra note 292, at 63; KING, supra note 292, at 848; YATS, supra note 292.
According to his own notes, Madison said:
Mr. MADISON supposed that if a proper proportion of each branch should be required
to overrule the objections of the Executive, it would answer the same purpose as an
absolute negative. It would rarely if ever happen that the Executive constituted as ours
is proposed to be would, have firmness [enough] to resist the legislature, unless backed
by a certain part of the body itself. The King of [Great Britain] with all his splendid
attributes would not be able to withstand [the] unanimous and eager wishes of both
houses of Parliament. To give such a prerogative would certainly be obnoxious to the
temper of this Country; its present temper at least.
MADISON, supra note 292.
King's notes state: "Madison - opposed - No man would dare negative a Bill unanimously
passed. It is even doubtful whether the King of England [would] have Firmness enough to do so."
KING, supra note 292, at 848.
Yates's notes report: "Mr. Madison against it - because of the difficulty of an executive
venturing on the exercise of this negative, and [Madison] is therefore of [the] opinion that the
revisional authority is better." YATES, supra note 292.
298. See MADISON, supra note 292, at 63. Madison's notes report:
Mr. BUTLER had been in favor of a single Executive Magistrate; but could he have
entertained an idea that a [complete] negative on the laws was to be given him[,J he
certainly should have acted very differently. It had been observed that in all countries
the Executive power is in constant course of increase. This was certainly the case in
[Great Britain]. Gentlemen seemed to think that we had nothing to apprehend from an
abuse of the Executive power. But why might not a Cataline or a Cromwell arise in
this Country as well as in others[?]
Id. Butler referred to Lucius Sergius Catiline, a Roman conspirator in the First Century B.C., and
to Oliver Cromwell, who took the title of Lord Protector of the Commonwealth in Great Britain in
the mid 17th Century.
King's notes summarized: "Butler opposed - because it [the executive] will become king."
KING, supra note 292, at 847.
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objected to any check on the Congress beyond laying out the congressional
powers in the Constitution and allowing the one House of Congress to check the
other. 29 George Mason of Virginia expressed his fear that the Convention was
creating an elective monarch more dangerous than the British King. 3°° Franklin
closed the debate by echoing Butler's fears of a power-hungry President and
299. See MADISON, supra note 292, at 64; YATES, supra note 292. Madison's notes recount:
Mr. BEDFORD was opposed to every check on the [legislature], even the Council of
Revision first proposed. He thought it would be sufficient to mark out in the Constitution
the boundaries to the Legislative Authority, which would give all the requisite security
to the rights of the other departments. The Representatives of the people were the best
Judges of what was for their interest, and ought to be under no external [control]
whatever. The two branches would produce a sufficient [control] within the Legislature
itself.
MADISON, supra note 292, at 64.
Yates's notes state: "Mr. Bedford is against the whole, either negative or revisional - the two
branches are sufficient checks on each other - no danger of subverting the executive, because his
powers may by the convention be so well defined that the legislature cannot overleap the bounds."
YATES, supra note 292.
300. See MADISON, supra note 292, at 64-65; KING, supra note 292, at 848. Madison's notes relate
Mason's speech:
[Colonel] MASON observed that a vote had already passed . . . for vesting the executive
powers in a single person. Among these powers was that of appointing to offices in
certain cases. The probable abuses of a negative had been well explained by Dr.
[Franklin] as proved by experience, the best of all tests. Will not the same door be
opened here[?] The Executive may refuse its assent to necessary measures till new
appointments shall be referred to him; and having by degrees engrossed all these into
his own hands, the American Executive, like the British, will by bribery [and] influence,
save himself the trouble [and] odium of exerting his negative afterwards. We are[,] Mr.
Chairman[,] going very far in this business. We are not indeed constituting a British
Government, but a more dangerous monarchy, an elective one. We are introducing a
new principle into our system, and not necessary as in the British [Government] where
the Executive has greater rights to defend. Do gentlemen mean to pave the way to
hereditary Monarchy? Do they flatter themselves that the people will ever consent to
such an innovation? If they do[,] I venture to tell them, they are mistaken. The people
will never consent. And do gentlemen consider the danger of delay, and the still greater
danger of a ... rejection, not for a moment but forever, of the plan which shall be
proposed to them[?] Notwithstanding the oppressions [and] injustice experienced among
us from democracy; the genius of the people is in favor of it, and the genius of the
people must be consulted. He could not but consider the federal system as in effect
dissolved by the appointment of this Convention to devise a better one. And do
gentlemen look forward to the dangerous interval between the extinction of an old, and
the establishment of a new [Government] and to the scenes of confusion which may
ensue[?] He hoped that nothing like a Monarchy would ever be attempted in this
Country. A hatred to its oppressions had carried the people through the late Revolution.
Will it not be [enough] to enable the Executive to suspend offensive laws, till they shall
be coolly revised, and the objections to them overruled by a greater majority than was
required in the first instance[?] He never could agree to give up all the rights of the
people to a single Magistrate.
MADISON, supra note 292, at 64-65.
King's notes report:
Mason - opposed - We have voted that the executive power [should] be vested in
one person - it is now proposed to give this person a negative in all cases - you have
agreed that he shall appoint all officers, not otherwise to be appointed, and those he
has not the sole power to appoint, you propose to grant him the power to negative -
with these powers the Executive will become a monarchy. We must regard the Genius
of our People, which is Republicanism, [and the people] will not receive a King.
KING, supra note 292, at 848.
Yates's notes summarize: "Mr. Mason [was] against the'negative power in the executive, because
it will not accord with the genius of the people." YATES, supra note 292.
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Mason's fear of monarchy.30 ' The ten states then present and voting at the
Convention then voted unanimously against the motion.3 2
The contingent emergency procedure deprives Congress of an override. Whose
fault is that, however, if not the Congress's? The President did not force the
Congress to enact the Budget Enforcement Act, or the law providing the contin-
gent emergency power, for that matter. The effect of the contingent emergency
procedure is similar to the case where the Congress of its own choosing adjourns,
preventing the President's return of a bill with his objections. The Congress's
actions there prevent the Congress from having the chance to override. With
regard to that case, the Court in the Pocket Veto Case rejected the Congress's
predicament as its own doing.3 3
As well, the emergency procedure is similar to a delegation of Congressional
power to the President. Congress may condition the operation of legislation on
the President's determination of certain facts.
3 °4
301. MADISON, supra note 292, at 65-66. According to Madison's notes:
[DOCTOR] FRANKLIN. A Gentleman from [South Carolina] [Mr. Butler] a day or two
ago called our attention to the case of the [United] Netherlands. He wished the gentleman
had been a little fuller, and had gone back to the original of that [Government]. The
people being under great obligations to the Prince of Orange whose wisdom and bravery
had saved them, chose him for the Stadtholder. He did very well. Inconveniences
however were felt from his powers; which growing more [and] more oppressive, they
were at length set aside. Still however there was a party for the [Prince] of Orange,
which descended to his son who excited insurrections, spilt a great deal of blood,
murdered the de Witts, and got the powers revested in the Stadtholder. Afterwards
another Prince had power to excite insurrections [and] to make the Stadtholdership
hereditary. And the present [Stadtholder] is ready to wade [through] a bloody civil war
to the establishment of a monarchy. [Colonel] Mason had mentioned the circumstances
of appointing officers. He knew how that point would be managed. No new appointment
would be suffered as heretofore in [Pennsylvania] unless it be referred to the Executive;
so that all profitable offices will be at his disposal. The first man put at the helm will
be a good one. No body knows what sort may come afterwards. The Executive will be
always increasing here, as elsewhere, till it ends in a Monarchy[.]
Id.
King's notes record: "Franklin - The Prince of Orange at first had limited Powers, and his
office was for Life - his son raised a faction & caused himself to be declared hereditary - we may
meet the same fate." Kno, supra note 292, at 848.
302. See MADISON, supra note 292, at 66; YATES, supra note 292.
303. The Court said:
[I]t is plain that when the adjournment of Congress prevents the return of a bill within
the allotted time, the failure of the bill to become a law cannot properly be ascribed
to the disapproval of the President - who presumably would have returned it before
the adjournment if there had been sufficient time in which to complete his consideration
and take such action - but is attributable solely to the action of Congress in adjourning
before the time allowed the President for returning the bill had expired. Thus, in La
Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, supra, 454, this Court said that "if by its
action, after the presentation of a bill to the President during the time given him by
the Constitution for an examination of its provisions and for approving it by his
signature, Congress puts it out of his power to return it, not approved, within that
time to the House in which it originated, then the bill fails, and does not become a
law."
279 U.S. at 678-79
In a footnote, the Court noted: "And if Congress so desires the same bill may be re-introduced
and passed when Congress resumes its session, and after receiving the due consideration of the
President, if returned with his objections, may be then passed by the requisite vote in both House."
Id. at 679 n.6. But see Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that
passing a measure a second time is by no means an easy thing).
304. See The Cargo of the Brig Aurora, Burnside v. U.S., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813) (where
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Note another similarity as well. To the extent that the emergency provisions
of a bill constitute only part of the spending in the bill, the emergency procedure
has the same effect as granting the President an absolute line-item veto over the
emergency items. The President can and does designate appropriation emergencies
by dollar amountsa°5 and can designate spending or revenue emergencies by
provision.3°0 The President's power over these spending items thus has the surgical
precision of a line-item veto. As the President may sign the law and not designate
the emergency (in whole or in part), the President has the equivalent of an
absolute line-item veto over the emergency spending items.
Thus, although the Founders vehemently disapproved of granting the Pres-
ident "an absolute negative" over all bills, the Congress through its actions may
surrender such power to the President for particular bills or portions of bills. In
sum, the emergency procedure is a abdication of legislative power of the sort of
which the Court has rule constitutional in the past, but of which many of the
Framers would not have approved.
V. CONCLUSION
Creating fixed limits on spending for a period of time poses a dilemma for
the policy-maker. If the limits bind too tightly or cannot accommodate changed
circumstances, then participants in the process will reject them, as they did the
fixed Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets in 1987307 and again in 1990.308 If
the limits do not bind tightly enough, then they fail in their fundamental purpose,
contributing to deficit reduction.
Recent budget agreements between the President and Congress have attempted
to address this dilemma by creating an exception for emergencies. The emergency
exception serves as a safety valve to let off steam and prevent an agreement from
blowing up. The safety valve itself, however, poses the same dilemma. Too tight
a setting on the valve lets off too little pressure. Too loose a setting on the valve
allows spending to increase, presenting an opportunity for those who wish to
escape the machine altogether. Several Senators and the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget have expressed the concern that the emergency




the Court upheld a legislative scheme made operational by a Presidential proclamation with regard
to whether Great Britain violated the neutral commerce of the United States); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AME CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 362 (2d ed. 1988).
Congress has granted the President a number of emergency powers. See generally STAFF OF
SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON NATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS, 93D CONG.,
2D SESS., A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES (Comm. Print 1974)
(prepared by H. Relyea of the Library of Congress under direction of Committee staff).
305. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
306. See Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 252(e); 2 U.S.C. § 902(e) (Supp. II 1990); supra text
accompanying note 91.
307. With the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1989.
308. With the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.
309. See, e.g., Senate Mid-Session Hearings, supra note 138, at 181-82 (statement of Sen.
Domenici); id. at 222-23 (statements of Sen. Bond and Director Darman).
Senator Grassley went on to turn the use of the word "emergency" around, questioning whether
the deficit itself constituted an emergency:
Could I suggest this, that, you know, one way of some pressure value approach,
when Congress cannot see far enough ahead, is this declaration of emergency. Well, if
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Some have suggested that just as families have to meet their emergencies by
spreading the emergency costs out over time, the law should merely facilitate
shifting among years within the caps. This rule might lead to an increase in shifts
among years like that caused by the one-year focus of the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act. The opportunity to put off painful choices to another day sorely
tempts participants in the budget process. The rule would thus have to limit the
exception, once again. One might well question, then, whether a limited oppor-
tunity to postpone pain provides enough of a release from the constraints of the
system to avoid building up pressures to overturn the system in its entirety.
Some have expressed the fear that the contingent emergency designation has
such subtle appeal that a large share of all legislation could be designated as an
emergency. 10 A widespread use of contingent emergencies would transfer an even
wider scope of fiscal powers to the President, who could then pick and choose
among spending that he wanted. This appears an unlikely result at present, as
even advocates of heavy spending want to have some certainty that at least some
of the spending advocated will eventually take place. If contingent emergency
spending bills become too common, the President will find it all that much easier
not to designate the emergencies. The contingent emergency has utility only if it
would be embarrassing for the President to turn down the proffered emergency
funding, as was the case with the unemployment insurance bill.
At this writing, the emergency exception has not led to a significant increased
in the deficit. So far, in the words of the Congressional Budget Office, "The
budget summit agreement ... is holding." '' As that Office notes, the vast
we have a declaration of emergency, that is probably going to mean more spending.
But is it not about time that there be an emergency with respect to the deficit, and at
what threshold should we consider the deficit out of control and in need of adjustment?
... And maybe an emergency for a budget deficit out of control is one of the things
we ought to consider.
Mr. Darman. Yes, sir, I would not want to diminish your emphasis on the importance
of doing more. I agree with that completely.
I would not wish to use an emergency declaration for the purpose you suggest. I
agree with the comments made by several Senators earlier, that we can see strains
coming on the system ahead. If we stick with current law and do get the growth
assumptions we have made, the .deficit will be coming down substantially....
But what Senator Sasser in his opening statement and others have suggested is that
the stresses on the system are going to rise, the pressure with respect to the caps, the
desire to use the emergency designation as a way to get out from under spending limits
and so on, that that could have very severe adverse effects, and that we ought to start
working on an orderly basis on the further changes that will have to be made in fiscal
year 1993 and 1994 and 1995, and I would hope we could continue to do so in the
spirit of bipartisan[ship] that has held the budget agreement together to this point,
because I think that discipline is an advance. It has not gotten us where we want to
be, but it is definitely an advance.
Id. at 246-47.
310. See, e.g., supra note 216 (statement of Sen. Domenici). Additional evidence for this
proposition appeared in the large number of amendments filed during consideration of the unem-
ployment insurance bill. See supra note 198.
311. CONOESSIONAL BUDGET OFicE, supra note 222, at 41. See also CONORESSIONA. BUDGET
OFFICE, supra note 251, at 40 ("The Congress and the President have hewed closely to the terms of
the Budget Enforcement Act.). The Congressional Budget Office summarizes the effect of emergency
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majority of emergency spending has been for Desert Shield costs for which
foreign governments have reimbursed or will reimburse the United States.3"2
Another concern raised by the emergency procedures is the possibility that
participants in the budget process might use them as a means of avoiding financing
contingency funds. For example, the Government regularly sets aside pools of
money to address natural disasters."' The budget agreement levels take into
account a certain predicted amount of funding for these contingency funds. If
participants in the budget process finance these contingency funds at unrealistically
low levels, relying on emergency designations when the expected disaster does
come, then the emergency procedure will have resulted in increased spending by
the amount of the underfunding. Although it is difficult not to consider these
natural disasters as emergencies within the plain meaning of the term, the Office
of Management and Budget has legitimately sought to distinguish these amounts
as expected.
31 4
Another concern is that the emergency exception merely creates another
species of off-budget spending that can escape regulation through the regular
budget process." 5 Taken along with recent statutory changes taking the Postal
Service, 1 6 the Social Security Trust Funds,317 and parts of the savings and loan
and bailout 18 off the books, this concern is legitimate. For the items that the
budget process declares to be exceptions to annual limits, the process loses
control. One can question whether funding on these ends, as worthy as they are,
should necessarily be beyond any review. Should Congress not consider the
funding levels for these Government programs along with those for all others?
As well, removing these amounts from spending limits makes the residual limits
all the more unrealistic as tools to measure the activities of Government.
319
One might welcome the result if Congress took all programs off budget.
The Budget Committees would change their names to the Off-Budget Committees.
spending as follows:
The budget summit agreement, as codified in the Budget Enforcement Act, is holding.
Appropriation bills moving through the Congress are hewing to the dollar caps set in
the act. Emergency legislation, specifically envisioned in the law, was enacted to pay
for the costs of Operation Desert Storm; much of this spending will be recouped from
foreign contributions. A handful of other urgent needs, totaling about $2 billion, also
received the emergency designation. Still uncertain is the fate of a bill passed in early
August that would extend unemployment insurance benefits for some recipients if the
President declares an emergency. Policymakers have enacted no other significant enti-
tlement or tax legislation this year (under the rules of the summit, such legislation in
total must not raise the deficit).
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 222, at 41-42.
312. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 222 at 41-42;.; see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, supra note 148 and accompanying text (citing the high share of defense - that is, Desert
Shield - expenditures among emergencies).
313. That is the mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
314. See Office of Management and Budget, Report on the Costs of Domestic and International
Emergencies and on the Threats Posed by the Kuwaiti Oil Fires (June 27, 1991); see Office Of
Management and Budget, supra note 134 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (remarks of Senator Graham expressing concern
about taking items off budget).
316. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989.
317. Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 § 13301, 104 Stat. at 1388-623.
318. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989.
319. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON BUDGET CONCEPTS (1967).
Budget Emergencies
Congress would once again make choices among all of the Government's pro-
grams. Indeed, one can rationally argue for eschewing all fixed limits on spending,
as then Congress and the President would be free to decide among programs
strictly on their merits, without regard to their short-term costs. Quite frequently
short-term costs (that is, costs within the lifetime of a budget agreement) might
appear large for a program that saves money in the long term. a20 One can imagine
a world outside of the limits of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the Budget
Enforcement Act: the English-speaking world enjoyed such an existence at least
from the founding of the Parliament's Ways and Means Committee in 1641 to
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings's enactment in 1985. In this pre-1985 environment,
before supermajority points of order and sequestration, a majority of the Congress
(barring a filibuster or a veto) decided spending issues.32" '
Congress's habit of putting large portions of the Government's spending
beyond its effective control merely encourages those favored programs to grow
beyond reasonable amounts. The emergency exception, by providing another
passage to the favored land off budget, contributes to the quest among those
programs within the budget limits to exit.
For the emergency procedures to succeed, neutral or democratic principles
must govern the determination of what becomes an emergency. If the process of
determining emergencies does not appear open, it will justifiably breed resent-
ment. 22 One way to make the process more transparent is to define what
320. For example, advocates of funding for education of low-income children make this argument.
321. But see ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, 6 (requiring a supermajority for requisitions
from the states to collect revenue for the Government). The difficulty of raising funds under the
Articles of Confederation proved its undoing. See, e.g., MADISON, supra note 292, at 7, 13 (citing
the "radical infirmity" and "inefficiency" of the system under the Articles of Confederation).
322. The Chairman and the Ranking Republican Member of the Budget Committee have expressed
some concern about the breadth of the process by which the President and Congress designate
emergencies in a letter to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Senate Majority
Leader, and the Senate Republican Leader:
We are writing you to address the procedures for designating emergency funding
requirements pursuant to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law as amended by the Budget
Enforcement Act of 1990. We believe that we must work together to maintain the
integrity of the congressional budget process. Just as the joint leadership of Congress
- including representatives of the Budget Committee - came together with the
President's staff to craft the budget agreement, we believe that a joint effort is needed
to enforce the budget agreement.
In congressional budget enforcement under the Congressional Budget Act and Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings as amended by the Budget Enforcement Act, the Senate turns to its
Budget Committee to assess the costs of legislation. (See, e.g., sections 201(g), 302(g),
310(d)(4), 311(c), 313(e), of the Congressional Budget Act and section 258B(h)(4) of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.) Put in practical terms, the Presiding Officer turns to the
Chairman of the Budget Committee to advise the Chair of the Budget Committee's
position on whether a piece of legislation spends or cuts taxes so much that it violates
the constraints of the law.
In order for the Budget Committee to advise the Chair accurately whether a provision
will violate constraints in the law, the Budget Committee must make a determination
as to whether the provision falls within the emergency exception. This determination
necessarily involves a degree of judgment, as the legislation designating the provision
in all likelihood will not yet have become statute. Similarly, the President may make
his designation at any time up to and including the time of enactment of the provision.
To ensure the orderly accounting for the costs of legislation on the floor of the
Senate, the leadership of the Budget Committee must be included in any negotiations
1992]
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constitutes an emergency in detail. The Director of the Office of Management
and Budget appears headed down this route.323 It behooves the President to
maintain the powers so far delegated to the executive and to define more precisely
'"emergencies" so as to have apparently neutral bases on which to deny spending
requests not to the executive branch's liking.
One is tempted to consider arbitration of disputes over emergency designa-
tions, but the step toward arbitrating disputes between the Congressional Budget
Office and the Office of Management and Budget in the original Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings led the Supreme Court to overturn that law in Bowsher v. Synar.3 24 If
one then follows down the road that the drafters of the 1987 revision of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings did, one would next consider neutral (or at least more neutral)
outside agency heads as arbiters. For example, could the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board make such determinations? Alternatively, Congress could give the
power to the head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, give that
officer a fixed, multi-year term longer than that of a President, and make that
officer removable only for cause. Going down this road risks creating too clever
a machine, and attributing too little cleverness to the regular legislative process.
Another way to ensure openness of the process of choosing emergencies is
to designate a larger defined group to address the issue. Problems arise in picking
a membership of such a group that would be small enough to be practical yet
large enough to be democratic.
The Congressional Budget Act provides its own safety valve in the form of
procedures whereby a supermajority may waive limits provided by the Act.3 2
This takes a step further in openness and participation. The system might be
better served by a simple supermajority requirement than a requirement that the
President agree.
The complexity of administering the safety valve demonstrates the difficulty
of long-term budget agreements. Planning far in advance requires leaving room
for adjustments to accommodate changed circumstances. These exceptions can
well grow to eat up the rule. The more significant the exceptions become, the
more sense it makes simply to negotiate limits for shorter periods.
The better solution is more regular deals, tailor made to the facts of the
day. It would be better simply to set more realistic caps and hold to those than
to create peculiar exceptions to get around obsolete ones. To be realistic, caps
must be set frequently. The Congressional Budget Act system of annual budgets
had something right with it, after all.
The system that requires parties to negotiate all exceptions does not work
where one party to an agreement is plainly more interested in avoiding exceptions
that lead up to the designation of provisions as emergency requirements. We urge you
to involve us in your discussions on this matter.
The budget summit called for both executive and congressional enforcement. Congress
has expressed its concerns about the Office of Management and Budget's potential for
abusing its role in this process. We hope that you will consult with us as both branches
of Government work to implement the budget summit agreement.
Letter from Sens. Jim Sasser & Pete V. Domenici to Director Richard Darman (Mar. 1991).
323. See supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
324. 478 U.S. at 721-34.
325. See Congressional Budget Act § 904(b) & (c).
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than the other; the first party will get the whip hand. By giving the President
an irrevocable veto over exceptions, Congress gave* the President more power
than it realized. If one assumes that the Congress will find it hard not to declare
an emergency given an opportunity, then the President will get relief from the
pressures of spending constraints when the executive branch needs it, but Congress
will not get relief from constraints unless the President chooses to grant it. In a
zero-sum game, administering the safety valve is a powerful position. That power
will grow as the pie begins to shrink, as it will under the existing caps. 26
In the end, an observer might ask why Congress chooses to bind itself in
such straightjackets as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the Budget Enforcement
Act. Senator Stevens may have asked the right, and indeed a telling, question
during the debate in the Senate on the amendment that would later become the
Budget Enforcement Act: "What I question is why a group of grown people
need to put parameters around themselves and their future colleagues in order
to do our job and to do it right.
'32 7
326. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE .ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 58-
62 (1991).
327. 136 CONG. REC. S15,830 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Stevens).
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